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CHAPTER I
INT RODDCT ION
1. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The three Circuit Court Judges in and for the State of Oregon,
County of Multnomah and sitting in the Department of Domestic Re-
lations have all expressed their concern over the fate of children in-
volved in the divorce process. The Honorable Jean L. Lewis, in
particular, has expressed concern about the children who are emo. ...
tionally torn by the continuing parental battle following the granting
of the divorce decree. This continuance of the fight is frequently ex ...
pressed in subsequent pleas to the court for a change of the custody
order initially granted. Although the legal procedure for handling
this action is clear, the "why" of the proces s is complex, frequently
obscure and causes considerable anguish to the concerned jurist who
must bring order out of an involved emotional dispute by using the
mechanics of a legalistic decision. It is in an attempt to bring some
beginning understanding to a complicated subject that this research
is addressed.
2II. A BROAD GENERALIZATION
ABOUT DIVORCE
Fam.ily dissolution has been a source of societal concern and
legislation as far back as history is recorded. There are three
means by which fam.ilies can be split: (1) divorce,· (2) separation,
and (3) death. All three are traum.atic events som.etim.es occurring'
suddenly and sometim.es requiring the lapse of m.uch tim.e before the
actual event happens. All three entail a loss. All three require ex-
tensive readjustm.ent: physical, financial and em.otional. It is in the
finer detail of feeling that divorce and separation differ m.arkedly
from death. In this paper we shall deal with one small segm.ent of
the phenom.enon of divorce.
~ .
C=="i.:r0rce affects not only the individuals within a group but the
g.roup ,as a whole and therefore is a legitimate m.atter of concern to a
society. All civilizations and societies have the fam.ily, in one form
or another, as a base; the smallest unit of the whole. The whole is
radically affected by the events which transpire in the base unit. As
a consequence laws are established to govern and control that which
m.ay adversely affect the total organism.. All societies have some
legal provision for keeping fam.ilies together. There are laws gov-
erningboth m.arriage and divorce. Protection is provided both to
the individual and the group by the laws of the group establishing the
circum.stances under which both m.arriage and divorce m.ay occur.
3,Since the need of the total group .is to keep the sub~group, intact, the
laws allowing for the establishment of the marital contract are far
more lenient than those providing for its dis solution.
Divorce is not only seen as a threat to the total group but,
more obviously, is seen as a catastrophic event to the individuals in-
volved. This base family unit must be composed of at least two
individuals but can be composed of a much larger number. The im-
portant decisions for this family unit are usually made by two core
people, the marital partners. Their behavior, attitudes and deci-
sions have far~reaching effects. What either one or both marital
partners decree shall happen to the family unit is not necessarily
what the other family members want but since this is not a demo-
cratic institution the wishe s of the marital pair, either jointly or
singly, tend to govern the unit activity. Especially in divorce the
wishes of one partner can rule the family unit since it often takes
only one dissatisfied member to dissolve the marriage. Thus, (i~ the1-"-
eventuality of divorce, the core partners or parents are sometimes
in agreement and sometimes not. Whether or not they are in agree-
ment the remaining family members, the children, are frequently
caught in the conflict area. Since the children, issue of the cor:e
members, are part of each parent, their loyalties can be expected to
be divided. They will not want to suffer loss, loss being an integral
part of family dissolution. Neither will they want to give up their
4identity. with the departing parent, although the rem.aining parent may
subtly require this. (See reference to Dom.inian, Chapter II, page
33.) Since these children cannot physically be divided in half they
must live with one or the other of the fam.ily core m.em.bers, perhaps
eventually to become a part of an altered family un~ithat least one c
different core m.em.ber. Som.etimes this process can occur without
appreciable difficulty; all the bits and piece s of emotion gradually
and smoothly fitting into place.[usually the process of dissolution
and resettlement is traumatic to a greater or lesser degree. The
courts, in the process of enforcing the societal laws, playa :major
part in this human drama at least once and sometimes repeatedl>::..!
This research project is a descriptive study of families who appear
before this court more than once.
III. THE HISTORY OF DIVORCE
Isabel Drummond (1931) says that the first divorce was ac-
complished by administering poison. Institutionalism of both mar-
riage and divorce did not arise until the acquisition of property. The
wife then became the husband's property to do with as he saw fit, in~
eluding divorcing her. As civilization developed the wife acquired
some rights, usually through her dowry and some equality.
Bardis (1964) makes an excellent comparison of early patterns
of divorce. In the ancient Heb.rew family the double standard was
5reflected in divorce policies. It was neither a civil nor religious
concern but a ceremonial matter. It was considered the right of the
husband to simply hand his wife a bill of divorcement. In the seventh
century B. C. the Deuteronomic Code attempted to protect the wife by
instituting some restrictions making divorce less hasty. The Mi.snah,
a collection of oral laws which became the basis for the Talmud,
added further restrictions. Children in divorce remained in the
woman's custody until they'were weaned. After that time it was op-
tional with her to retain custody but the father could claim custody
of the boys after they were six.
Bardis (1964) says that not much is known of ancient Greek di~
vorce laws. In the few writings reference is mainly to Athens.
Divorce was generally a private matter except that the state inter ..
fered to some extent in the case of adultery. In the event of divorce
the,wife's dowry was returned to her family. The wife was also'al-
lowed to divorce her husband with his consent; otherwise she had to
supply evidence of his cruelty. In Greek divorces witnesses were
required,and the husband was required to pay alimony.
Bardis (1964) notes that in ancient Rome there was no divorce.
Some author s believe that as late as 23 B. C. the first divorce was
granted although earlier men perhaps did divorce their wives. Di-
vorce was considered a private matter. Judicial procedure was un=
necessary unless there was disagreement over the property or
6children. In later centuries divorce became exceedingly common
and was considered socially acceptable.
In the Christian family, according to Bardis (1964), emphasis
was usually placed on the indissolubility of marriage although some
early Christian fathers accepted limited grounds as reasons for di-
vorce. This lack of agreement is indicated by the debate of Christian
leader s over the matter for 1, 100 year s before completing the ec-
clesiastical code dealing with the matter. Drummond (1931) goes on
to explain that the influence of the early Christian church made mar-
riage a sacrament. To marry was at first a confession of weakness
and therefore divorce was a question of greater weakness. Marriage
was not valid except under church sanction and therefore became a
holy prison. Men's adulteries were excused; women were subjugated
to their "lord" until the nineteenth century.
Drummond (1931) felt that lack of unity of interpretation and
confused thinking characterized actual practice and contrary to
Christian dogma concerning the indis'solubility of marriage, mar;.,
riages were in fact dissolved. Nearly all divorces were obtained by
men. Public prejudice against women, her economic dependence
and re strictions of the law made divorce for her extremely difficult.
She was expected to suffer as part of God's will and as expiation for
the sin of being a woman.
Drummond (1931) 'finds that the influence of the church on
7divorce legislation begins in the fourth century when church dogma
was incorporated into seculqr law and expanded by the prevailing
church authorities of the times. Consent to a divorce by the other
party was regarded as collusion and could prevent the granting of a
remedy, except where the parties were wealthy or powerful, in which
case consent was encouraged. This doctrine has been clung to un-
compromisingly in form, if not in practice, and is in effect today
throughout the United States.
She note s that the age of canon law came to an end with the
Reformation. However, secular law tended to adopt the same prin-
ciple s which had been held by canon law and "crime" was still con-
sidered to be the legal base for divorce. The position of women was not
much changed by the Reforrnationeither. Woman and her belongings
continued to be the husband's possessions.
Drummond (1931) points to the French Revolution as probably
.producing more change in divorce laws than any other single move-
ment. The principles of Roman law were re-established in which
men and women were proclaimed to have both rights and duties in
marriage, which was again proclaimed to be a civil contract. Di-
vorce by mutual consent did not become established but the dogma of
the indis solubility of marriage was gone.
De spite change s, Drummond (1931) reveals that canon law was
allowed to remain in effect in ecclesiastical courts. Henry VIII
8appointed a commission to revise it but his death prevented the rec-
onunended liberalizations from being made and Catholic canon law
continued to hold sway in a Protestant country. It is English common
law, founded on canonistic doctrine, on which most United States
legislation concerning marriage and divorce is based.
Drummond (1931) explains that marriage in America has al-
ways been a civil contract since colonists had no established church
or eccle siastical courts. But many of the anachronistic principle s
of canon law were a potent force in defining grounds and establishing
restrictions and inequities. One of the essential elements of a con-
tract has been the right to dissolve it for cause and some countries
recognize divorce by mutal consent. In the United States there is
hypocritical knowledge of prohibition in law, if not in fact. She
writes,
The powers exercised by judges in Arnerica parallels to a
great extent that of the emperors, popes and ecclesiastics,
for the discretion allowed them in divorce matters within a
more or less formal, if restricted, framework of grounds,
is almost unlimited. With their inherited and acquired
prejudices of one kind and another common to the human race
in general and with the growing disregard, particularly on
the part of women, of institutionalism, it is easy to under-
stand how hide-and- seek methods are used to gain de sired
ends.
Grounds for divorce and motives which cause the suit are sel-
dom the same but the inheritance of dogmatic beliefs prevents
bringing the two together.
9,Madden (1931) points out that the view of canon law regarding
the indis solubili tyof marriage was applied by the ecclesiastical court
in England. This latter court which had jurisdiction over marriages,
did grant an incomplete divorce, a judicial separation, called·~
mensaet thoro, upon strict proof of gross misconduct by either
party. This meant no collusion between the parties and onlyauthor-
ized separation without dissolving the marital bond and with no pro~
vision for remarriage. Total divorces in England were not known
prior to 1857. Annulments, a vinculo, were granted which rendered
the marriage void from the beginning. The condition that no marital
offense was considered sufficient cause for divorce proved unsatis~
factory. As early as the sixteenth century some efforts were made
to provide for divorce .. A few divorces were granted by Act of
Parliament, which meant only the wealthy could obtain relief. In
1857 the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was established,
thus removing jurisdiction from the ecclesiastical courts.
Madden (1931) notes that in the United States there were no
ecclesiastical courts. American courts of equity, did not have di-
vorce jurisdiction until it was conferred by legislative statutes.
Judicial divorce was established in this country much earlier than,in
England; in Pennsylvania as early as 1 785. Since marital status was
considered to be a matter of public interest, the legislature could
prescribe grounds for divorce. Divorce action was not considered a
10
private controversy between two individuals. The state is interested
as an adver se party so far as to oppose the granting of divorce ex~
cept within the prescribed legislative rules. Since the state favored
continuity of marriage relations, there is no common .law of divorce
in the United States and divorces may be granted only as provided by
statute.
IV. BASIS FOR DETERMINATION OF CUSTODY
Historically, the mother has had few rights where the children
were concerned. This has been in the process of gradual change
over the years so that at the present parents either have equal rights
or the mother would appear to have superior rights to the children.
By the common law of England, Madden (1931) states, the
father had an almost absolute right to the custody of his legitimate
children. In the law courts it was practically impossible to make a
showing of unfitness against the father. Cases of the most extreme
sort appear in English history in which fathers, morally unfit to have
custody of their children, have yet prevailed in the courts. The
reason for this extreme position was a practical one; the support of
the child had to be provided by someone and unless a child had prop-
erty of his own there was reluctance to remove him from his father.
The inferior position of married women with reference to their in-
come and earnings had its effect upon the practicability of the
11
Chancellor's removing the child from l1.is father.
Madden (1931) revealstnat in 1839, in England, the power of the
ChancellQr to determine custody'was conferred by statute as to in-
fants under age seven and .in 1886 was changed to include infants of
any. age.
In the United State s the strict view of the father's rights as
taken:by the English courts was never adopted, according to Madden
'(1931). The 'welfare of the child has always been.the controlling,cir-
cumstance. VerY'young children were frequently placed with the
mother, if she was fit, unless awarding the child to her would tend to
encourage her to remain away from her husband. When the child
reached the age where it no longer peculiarly needed the mother's
cq.re, the father as head of the family, and entitled to the child's ser-
vices and under a duty to support it, was entitled to custody unless
he was unfit or unle s s the child's welfare would be harmed by.'being
:with ,its father. In some states statutes were enacted declaring
rights of the, father and mother equal. The court would seem to have
a free hand in selecting the custodian. However, the father's right
to select a.homeandhis duty.to suppo.rt tended to give him prefer-
ence over the mother.
Drummond ( 1931) note s thq.t children, during their minority,
are wards of the state. This supreme guardianship· grows out of the
tripartite marriage relation between ·man"'woman- state. Natural
12
parents are considered trustees but tq.is position depends upon the
successful discharge of their responsibility. Dereliction of duty
calls for assertion of the state's authority. This is why the courts,
under their general chancery powers, have jurisdiction in divorce
over the offspring of themar:r;iageand their property whether there
is statutory authorization ,or not. All states now have enacted legis-
lation ,regarding custody and support from divorced parents.
Drummond (1931) finds the majority of courts holding that,
where the children are outside the jurisdiction of the state at the time
this jurisdiction was taken, the court has no power to award custody
,in the decree. Once jurisdiction has been acquired, however, the
court retains this throughout the minority of the children ,and it may
be invoked at anytime. Inrnany states statutes are sufficiently
,broad to permit the court to 'make a tem.porarydetermination of cu,s-
tody 'pending ,final action. The general practice is to 1makean award
of custody in the final decree.
Madden (1931) says that the court in exercising its discretion
in awarding custody,looks to the best interest of the child. Bistori-
cally, the mother is frequently given custody of very young. and sickly
children and there ,is some tendency ,to give girls to the mother and
boys to the father. Thewinning.party in the divorce suit mayor
may not gain custody. The award maybe made to the guilty party in
light 0.£ the children's best interests. Where children have reached
·13
the age of discretion (a term generally undefined in the law and the
literature); and theparen,ts q,re of equal fitne s s the court frequently
concedes to the child-'s-wishes.. If one parent is fit and the other un-
fit, custody will be awarded to the former.
Drummond (1931) specifies that visitation is usually allowed to
,the p~rent not receiving. custody.. This privilege may.bewithdrawn
by. the court but a finding of fault or guilt relative to the divorce is
not, of itself, sufficient reason to deny visitation..
She notes that as a rule statutes also provide for the support
and maintenance of minor children' although if relief is not prayed for
in the divorce petition the decree is usually silent on the question.
The tendency,is to stress relevant facts bearing on the·welfareof the
child as well as on the financial abilitie s of the parent and to recog-
nizea continuing.liaQility on.the part of the father to support his
children.
She, explains th~t decree s are subject to' modification -where
changed conditions require a .revision of the existing o'rder. Madden
(1931) explains that the award of the children to one parent or the
other does not permanently settle the right of custody. A change of
circumstances may, authorize the. court to order a change of custody.
For example, if amqther followingan·award of custody to her, be-
comes unfit the custodymay,he granted to the father if he is fit.
Whe.re a parent to whom custody 'was awarded, even though it m.ay
. 14
have been because of the unfitness of the other, afterward dies, the
other may. obtain custody by showing that he has become fit or that it
is in the child's interest. Drummond (1931) indicates that some
courts take the view that upon ,the death of one parent the other
parent. is automatically. entitled to custody.
V. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DIVORCE
AND CUSTODY IN OREGON
The appropriate statute s are set by the legislature.. Applica-
tion of them is made by a duly elected official, a judge, in a court of
equity. An appeal from the trial judge's decision maybe taken to the
Supreme Court of the State of Oregon. The hearing in the Supreme
Court is de~ on the record made, i. e., the court can rule on .the
facts· a second time •
.The fir st divorce law in ,Oregon was enacted in 1862. There
have been a~number of revisions since. The present law was enacted
by the 47th Legislative Assembly in 1953, . with revisions in 1955,
.1959,.1961, 1963 and 1965. The legal basis on which divorce may
be granted is established under Oregon Revised Statute (hereinafter
referred to'as ORS),107. 030 "Grounds for Divorce. "The dissolution
of the marriage contract may. be declared·at the suit or claim of the
injured party. for any of the following causes:
1. Impotency existing ,at the time of the marriage and continu-
ing to the commencement of the suit.
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2. Adultery.
3. Conviction of a felony.
4. Habitual gross drunkenness contracted since marriage and
continuing for one year prior to the commencement of the
suit.
5. Willful desertion for the period of one year.
6. Cruel and inhuman treatment or personal indignities ren-
dering life burdensome.
7. Permanent mental illness where the defendant has been ad-
judged mentally ill by a court of competent jurisdiction.
In practice cruel and inhuman treatment is the most commonly
stated basis and in this study·was almost the only basis for filing
:which,was used by the parties in our sample.
The aforementioned revision in 1961 provides that the father
shall have equal opportunity 'with the mother to gq.in custody of the
children. The court's strong language regarding gros s depravity.of
the mother as an, influential factor in. determining custody occurred
prior to thi s 196 L amendment providing for equal opportunity.between
the parents. There are three pertinent sections of the Oregon .law
which deal with award of custody, and modification of the decree.
ORSI07. 090 vests power in the courts to grant custody
i';
,pe;nden,te lit~.(pendinglitigation).
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1. After the commencement of a suit for dissolution of the
ma,rriagecontract or to have a marriage declared void
and before a decree therein, the court may, in,its dis-
cretion, upon proper showing of the necessity therefor,
provide by order as follows:
a.
b. For the care, custody 'and maintenance of the minor
cqildrenqf the marriage during the pendency of the
suit.
ORS 107.100 provides for the award of custody as part of the
divorce action.
Whenever a marriage is declared void or dissolved, the
court has power further to decree:
a. For the future care and custody of the minor children
of the marriage as it may deem just and proper. In
determining custody the court shall consider ,the best
interests of the child and the past conduct and demon-
strated moral standards of each of the parties. No
preference in custody shall be given to the mother
over the father for the sole reason that she is the
mother.
ORS 107. 130 grants statutory authQrity for the modification of
the decree by subsequent judicial action.
1. The court, or judge thereof, has the power at anytime
after a decree is given, upon the motion 0'£ either party,
to:
a. Set aside" alter or modify so much of the decree as
may provide for the appointment of trustees, for the
support andcu,stody oJ minor children, for the nur-
ture or education thereof, or both, or for the main-
tenance of either party to the suit.
On the basis of these statutory provisions a judge makes a de-
cisionwhich .in substantial measure determines the future direction
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of the individual families. The phrase, "best interest of the chil-
dren" is vague and ill defined. The statutes do not make specific
mention of the basi s which warrants a change in the custodial parent.
The basic factor which must always be met is "a change in circum-
stance s." The Oregon'Supreme Court has affirmed and reaffirmed
this requirement through their interpretations. In Bogh vs.
Lumbattis (1955), considered a basic case on which many other de-
cisions and interpretations rest, the Court said,
An ,application .for modification must show there has· been a
change in the conditions and circumstances since the last
order respecting the child's custody and that such change is
adver s,e to the child's welfare. The petitioner must further
demonstrate that the change of custody proposed would be to
the child's benefit.
The Cou,rt also said -in Boghvs. Lumbattis (1955), "The best
interests of the minor are the governing criterion. What are the best
interests have to' be determined from the facts of each case. "
Supreme Court decisions constitute a body of accumulated in-
terpretations by which the jurist is governed and guided in his or her
task. There a.re inconsistencies in these rulings which make actual
applicationadif£icult and often peremptory matter. The inexact and
undefined nature of the subject matter allows for considerable lati-
tude on the part of the trial judge but also for much uncertainty as to
whether he or she will be up4eld or overruled by the superior court.
Robert Furlong (1962) in his article for the Willamette Law
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Journal provides a review of Supreme Court decisions-as they relate
to provisions for custody/of children. He cites several cases which
lTIake up this body of acculTIulated interpretations by which trial
judges are governed.in both their original and subsequent rulings.
VI. OREGON SUPREME COURT RULINGS
,A brief overview of SuprelTIe Court Decisions lTIade during the
~past twenty years points up the dilelTIma with which the trial judge
is faced.
In Gallagher vs. - Gallagher (1949), the Court finds that,
... general rules frequently do not decide specific cases.
Moreover, all rules of the kind just lTIentioned lTIust yield to
one of which-we have already taken notice; that is, that the
welfare of the child is of suprelTIe ilTIportance.
In Goldson ys. Goldson.( 1949),
The moral unfitness of the lTIother sufficient to deprive
her of custody must be such as to have direct bearing upon
the welfare of her child. It is not for every act of indiscre ~
tionor ilTImo,rality that she-will be denied custody. Thetest
is whether her conduct is so depraved, ilTImo.ral or wicked
that to permit her child to remain in her custody would be
injurious to its be st inter,e sts.
\,
In Gibson :vs. Gibson.( 1952),
In endeavoring to do what is best for the child, it is clearly
our duty to take into consideration the suitability of each
parent for the grave responsibility'which it seeks. Suitability
includes,. as its most important element, character.
Pickvs. Pick .(1952) held that a parent was entitled to custody
.as against a grandparent and said, .". . . paramount consideration is
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the welfare and best interests of this baby girl. We should not, nor
will we, permit her to be a pawn ,in the battle between her parents. "
Hendrickson vs. Hendrickson ( 1961) says that not only must
there be an improvement in circumstances of the moving party but a
worsening of the situation .of the other parent.
It is not enough to show that the petitioning parent is better
able to now care for the child than when the custodial order
was made. [The petitioning .mother] . . . has failed to show
any changed conditions, material or otherwise, that has oc-
curred.. . . in the father's· ability or inclination to care for
the child in the best manner or that the welfare of the child
has suffered by reason thereof.
In Shrout vs. Shrout (1960) the rule regarding moral unfitness
of a mother as stated in Goldson vs. Goldson ( 1949); was overruled
and the Court then went on to say:
We affirm the rule that not every act of indiscretion or
immorality should deprive 'amother of the custody of her
children.. In:all cases motherhood is a factor to be given
great weight in deciding questions of child custody.. We only
"want to make it clear that any moral transgressions of the
m.other must be considered, together with other relevant
factor s, .in determining .what is be s t for the childr en. We
think that arQitraryrules that exclude immorality as a
relevant factor unless it is "gross, " and "depraved, " or
"wicked" or "unless it has a direct bearing, " serve only to
hamp.er the trial courts in 'weighing :all the evidence and in
arriving .at adecisionwhich,will promote the welfare of the
child.
In 'a number of cases the Court holds that the trial judge who
hears .the evidence and observes the parties has an advantage over
the Supreme Court jurists ·who only review the record,. and are re-
luctant to change the trial judge·' s ruling. Bennehoff vs. Bennehoff
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(1956), $hrout vs. Shrout (1960), and Kroll vs. Kroll (1965) all cite
this principle .
. In James vs. James (1966) the children were awarded to the
plaintiff father in the orig·inal decree. He placed them with the de-
fendant's mother for care; the defendant was living in the same home.
Le s s than six months later the mother filed for modification ,of the
decree on the basis of her reformed behavior; she was no longer as-
sociatedwith the man with .whom she had been having. an affair prior
to the divorce. Themotion.was denied and the decision upheld., ap-
parently due to the short length of time of reformation.
In Cox vs. Cox ( 196 7} the court held that: "A motion Jor a
change in custody is not available to vindicate wounded pride nor to
punish the real or imagined social blunders of a former mate. "
In'·Kightlinger vs. Kightlinger (1968},it was ruled that in a situ-
ation in which both parents have demonstrated good care of children,
the best interests of the children(i.re best served if custody is
awarded to a parent who can support them. The Court held:
. Allowing for all the subtleties of testimony that slip ,away
from a reviewing court, consistent threads of evidence estab-
lish these facts:
1. The mother, married at 16 after two year s of high
school, is now 22, and is devoted to the children and
gives them good care .
2. The father, a career enlisted man .in the Coast Guard,
is 27; while he had temporary custody during preliminary
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proceedings he showed affection Jor the boys and gave
them good care. . . .
The trial co-q.rt disposed of the custody que stion on the apparent
assumption that children of tender years are ordinarily. better
off with their mother than,with their father. Prior to the
amendment of ORS.1.07. 100 in' 1961 this assumption had support
in many decisions of this court. . . . In each case the deci-
sionhadbeen rationalized as one that was best for the chil-
dren. Frequently since 1961 decisions have favored the
mothers. We have no follow..;, up procedure to indicate whether
these decisions have accurately predicted the future .. In each
case the trial court has attempted to place custody.where the
least harm.wouldbefall the children. Juvenile Court cases
and change-of-circumstances case s appealed to this court are
not a sample from which trustworthy generalizations can b,e
drawn. The trial courts are still confronted with a decisional
problem th~t defie s. standardized solution. Inmost case swe
affirm out of deference to the superior intuitive position of the
judge who sees the witnesses.
We believe that in, this case the trial court erred in taking two
b.oys away from a .father who was giving them good care and
.in placing them.with the mother where, even with the maximum
financial help to be expected of the father, the children are
likely to become public wards. We do not mean to imply.in
this discussion that economic considerations are dispositive
in custody eases,. but on the other hand, they. are not to be
ignored.
In Tingenvs. Ting·e~,(1968) the Court, for the first time, laid
down some specifics to consider in determining "best intere sts of the
children, " not strictly/where change is being considered but where
any award of cu.stody,is made.
In determining the best interests of a child in a custody dis-
pute the court ought to consider all the relevant factors.
These, as we see them, . would generally include:
1. . the condu,ct of the partie s;
2. the moral, emotional and physical fitness of the parties;
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3. the comparative physical environments;
4. the emotional ties of the child to other family memb,ers;
5. the interest of the parties in, -and -attitude toward-, the
child;
6. the age, s.ex,' and health of the child;
7. the de sirability of continuing ,an existing relationship
and environment; and
8. the p,reference of the child.
Best interest in custody matter s should not be determined by
iS0lating one of these variable factors and relying on it to the
exclus,ionof other factors, Rather, best interest should be
determined upon :these, and other, relevant factors by a
'weighing ,and balancirigprocess, and not by treating anyone
of them. as a fixed rule or standard.
VII. THE ADVERSARY PROCESS
·Divorceand c11.stody matters are conducted as adversa,ry pro-
ceedings, i. e., the husband and wife are opponents and are appearing
,in a 'Court of Equity for adjudication of their respective rights and
resp,onsibilities. They are asking that the court make fair and equal
distribution of accumulated property, of which their offspring ,are -a
part. The statutes clearly,- state that there is to b,e no collusion, no
secret agreement, _no conspiracy. If the letter of the law were fo1-
lowed in each instance the court would be faced with the monumental
task of arriving at decisions affecting every personal family matter,
even :where the p~rties are better able to manage than is the court.
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The divorce process in fact becomes a matter where most of the
p.roceedings are handled "by default" and only a few cases are heard
·as a contest between opposing parties. In a divorce decree granted
by default, the defendant file s no answer and the partie s have often
arrived 'at a mutually agreeable method of dividing their prop.erty,
usually 'with .the aid of an, attorney. Sometimes they have signed a
property settlement agreement which is incorporated into. the decree
and the pr0visions thereby become binding upon the parties and are
subject to. futuremodific·~tionby the court. Only one party is pres-
ent for the court hearing, or if the other is present he (she) declines
to put on testimony. The matter is handled within a few minutes
with a minimum.of the family problem publicly aired and with a mini-
mum aggravation of already sensitive feelings and injured pride.
This method of obtaining ,a divorce is, despite the law against collu-
sion, encouraged by both the legal and the social workp,rofe s sions
because oJ its obvious advantages.
Where the parties cannot come to some agreement,· a court
hearing must be held to settle the dispute. This is commonly re-
ferred to as a·"contested" divorce or "contest." Frequently it is
not the divorce itselfwh,ich is being disputed but possession of one or
more of the jo,intbe~ongings, the m.0st frequent being the children.
. Intbis type 0'£ hearing both pq.rties are present in court, each repre-
sented by counsel; the issues are debated; evidence is presented and
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witnesses are examined. Emotions between the parties usually_run
·high. Following such :a hearing :it may. be difficult for the parties to
d.eal effectively.' with each other over future matters pertaining to the
children.
VIII. SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF
THE PROBLEM
.It is in th,is emotionally charged atmosphere that a jurist must
make a cool and impartial decision·"in the best interest of the chil-
dren. " . There is no clear-cut guide for the court to follow in ma:king
these determination.s of custody. "Best interest of the children" 'is
at best avaglle, ill-defined term subject to the individual jurist's
interpretation•. About each family. situation little is known about the
dynamics behind these requested changes, which adds to the vague-
ness of the already -confusing picture facing the jurist. These cases
tend to' be time - consuming matter s, requiring an, inordinate amount
of court time, perhaps because of their very vagueness.
In,the p,rep-aration of this review a discussion was held with the
!ionorable Jean!L. Lewis, Circuit Court Judge, Department 12, who
p.rovidedinformation and legal directionandrnadeher library. ac-
ces sib,le Jor the gathering of data. Judge Lewis pointed out a major
area of uncertainty; if a parent is found to' be unfit at the time a
modification ,is requested, yet was exhibiting the same behavior as
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at the time of the divorce, does this or does it not constitute a change
of circurnstances? Does a rnotionbased on continuingha,.rmful be-
havior rather thana change in behavior warrant a change in custody?
As one becomes involved in this change process asa research-
er ,and no ,doubt as a jurist also, some specific questions arise:
1. Why do some but not all diViorcing couples return to the court
at a later time ina state of dissatisfaction over the custody
, arrangements which were originally made ?
2. What changes have occurred in the lives of the parties to
make change either requested, desirable, or both?
3. What do significant others (grandparents, new spouse, etc.)
ha,.ve to do'with this stated desire for a change?
4.. How frequently is this merely a continuation of the fight
which was begun.duringrnarriage, was continued in divorce
and is now focused on the only mutual interest area left--
the children?
5.. What common characteristics might this group have which
,would make their return .to the battle zone predictable?
6. What factor s "should be taken into consideration in the orig-
inal action to prevent this kind of later disruption?
7.. Are the factor s stated in the affidavit accompanying the mo-
tion to modify the real reasons or are they designed to
conform to requirements of the law?
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8. How often are change s manipulated by the children?
9. What part do finances play ,in requested changes ?(Is the
father tired of paying support; is the mother wanting to use
the children as a me~l ticket?)
10. How often is the issue actually visitation rather than
custody?
11. Should custodY'be a 'matter which is determined originally
.' and thereafter remains constant or should custody be a
flexible arrangement taking into account the developmental
needs of a child.,? For example, the difference ina boy's
need for his father at age 8 and at age 15.
IX. INTENT OF THE STUDY
In this research our attention is being directed to this group ,of
p,eople who appear before the court asking for reconsideration of the
o.riginal r"Uling.as it'pertains to custody of the children. Some of
these cases will originally, have been set and heard as a default mat-
ter; others will have ~een contested from the time of the first filing.,
perhaps also 'being heard ·as a contested matter or perhaps only on a
prima facie basis (sup,erficial and undisputed evidence is offered).
Our attempt is to findariy existing common denominators.in this
group. Are there sharedchqracteristics~whichmake possible early
,identification ,of a case that will later return for a .rehearing?
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Sugge stions- will he offered for furthe r study based on the de scription
0'£ these cases which returned for additional litigation during the year
1965.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF TIlE LITERATURE
Little has- been' written on divorce and the custody, of children.
The few reJerences found tend to deal with divorce and custody from
a statistical or legalistic viewpoint. Judges and attorneys have ·writ-
ten of the problems they face in the courts in interpreting .andapply-
.ingthe law. People who have been injured or hurt by divorce have
written of their experiences. But the b~dy of literature devoted to
the psychological impact of the divorce and custody process is
limited·as reflected .in the following survey of the literature.
1. EFFECT OF DIVORCE ON ,CHILDREN
There is general agreement in most of the literature that di-
vorce has harmful effects on children. However~ in our survey,we
foun,d that results of the research which has- been done in this area
"are far fromconclus~ve. Most o.f the sources agree that it is the
emotional estrang.ement, the hostility', and bickering~etweenparents
that is the chief causative factor in disturbance in children'and not
the actual termination of the marriage.
Sociologist Ivan Nye( 1968) found .inhis study that children of
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divorce often manifest fewer signs of disturbed behavior than chil-
dren ,from homes where parents remain together in spite of a deteri-
orating relationship marked by constant quarreling.
Failure to perceive the good adjustment both of children
and spouse s _in -many, broken home smay stem from a concen-
trationupon the tensions and adjustments -which occur at the
time of the break. After a period of adjustment, a new
equilibrium.is established" complicated perhaps by the neces-
sity for each family member to play new and less clearly,de-
fined role s, - but larg:ely free oJ the unbearable conflicts of
the previous unhappy marriage.
Robert Furlong ,(1962) points out that one of the greatest inju-
ries divorce does to c1)i1drenis the feeling of rejection it causes.
The damage divorce has on children in our culture may be greater
than ,in societies where the extended family .lives in close proximity,
, Fur10ng feels, and the children of divorce remain;with the mother's
o.r father's family, thus experiencing no drastic change in their way
,-o.f life.
Furlong ,(1962) makes the point that the bereavement of the
child whose h.ome is broken by death, "does not approach the strong,
personal ~ense ofg,uilt whicho.ften troubles the children of divorced
parents- because their mother and father have violated the mores of
society. "
Furlong ,(1962) expresses the opinion that the adversary frame-
work used in the courts -works well to determine the factual fault be-
tween ,strangers but he feels it is totally unsatisfactory in handling
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the problems of divorce. He states:
The very. essence of the adversary proceedings through
which a .divorce is granted tends to. implement the animos:ity
. and b,itterness of the couple and to, increase the p,robability
that they will bear numerous scars as a result of the debq,te,
acrimony, public name-calling and fault-finding, which are
inherent in the proceedings by which their divorce is granted.
William Goode .( 1956), asks the question, "Are the damaging ef-
fects of the divorce on the child greater than those of continuedhoD1e
conflict? "
Goode (1956), pQints to a study made by' Sheldon and Eleanor
Glueck attempting to' as se s s the relationship between ju:venile delin-
quency. and (a) divorced, (b), widowed,. and (c) separated homes, from
,which he draws the conclus.ion that" ... the best facts justify our
repeated insistence that the relationship between divorce and other
behavioral prdblems of children a;re not at all clear. "
The Gluecks (1950). of the Harvard Law School published what
has become a classic study in the analysis of crime causation. Their
study compared 500 per sistentlydelinquent boys with 500 non-
delinquent boys matched for age, general intelligence, national origin
and residence in underprivileged neighborhoods. Inassessingthe
wealth of data they/accumulated they could establish no direct causa-
tivelink. between ,delinquency and broken home s. They did note,
however, a higher incidence of divorce (21. 10/0) in delinquent homes
than in the homes of the non ... delinquent (11 %).
31
Mo.rtonHunt (1967) also refers to the study. done by the Gluecks
in making. his assumption that there is less correlation between de-
linquency and divorce than there is between delinquency· and socio~
-economic deprivation.
Quoting .aga,in from the Nye (1968) study.which .involved 780
adolescents in grades 9 through 12, he found,
As a group" adolescents in' broken homes show less psycho.-
somatic Hlne s s, Ie s s delinqu,ent behavior and better adjust-
-ment to parents than do children _in unhappy unbroken homes.
They do -not differ significantly, with re spect to adjustment in
school, church or delinquent companions.
II. CHILD CUSTODY FOLLOWING DIVORCE
Despite the fact that a pop,artist has seen fit to musically re-
cord the laIIlent of a non-custodial father 1, little is to be found in the
10 . C. Smith's recording of Daddy's Little Man, Columbia
Record, 1969.
My, my just look'at daddy's little man.
Stand there, let me take a look at you.
My, you must have grown about a foot or two since last
weekend.
Let's run ,in and·wash.your face and hands.
I want to take a little ·walkandhave a little talk,
With daddy's little man.
My, my just look at daddy's little man.
No, _I don't want abit of your mud pie, looks appetizing
,But think I'm gonnapass it by this time.
Got a dime right here in my hand.
Want to buy SOme ice cream and walk down by the stream
'With daddy's little man.
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literature concerning the problems germane to the granting or ob-
taining of custody,and those ensuing .after custody has been deter-
mined.
Kal and FruITless (1961), attorneys, writing from the legal
point of view note:
One of the most impo.rtant problems and that most difficult
of resolution :when a divorce is sought, and one which pro-
duces the most extreme bitterness, is that of custody of the
minor children o.f the marriage. In 'a majority of divorce
actions the defending ,party;will not conte st the divorce itself,
feeling, perhaps, that if the marriage has already reached the
point of rupture it would be futile to endeavor to keep.it to-
gether artificial1y. However, -where children are involved
and both parties love and ·want to keep ,the companionshipo.f
those children, a bitter contest will. in many cases develop.
In th.is respect, the courts are always extremely scrupulous
to keep .the interests of the child, the innocent victim of the
dis solution paramount.
Kal and·Frumess' observation of the interests of the child
You be careful with that ice cream cone,
Or momma's gdnna tan your hide.
Speaking of momma., is she all right?
Does she g.o out alot at night?
(No, ,I don't think bullfrogs lie)
Does momma still. see Mr. Jones?
You.know the man -who took you for a ride.
Does she ever look ',at you and cry?
(Yes,. I see the butterfly. )
No, it's just something .in my eye.
Remember that muscle you used to tell me about all the time?
, Let me see it. Sure thing, look at daddy's little man.
Well I guess you'd better kiss me bye bye now
Time just seems to ,fly somehow when you're having fun .
. I gotta run,. I'll call you .when I can.
.Maybe Sunday'! can g:o to the show with daddy's little man.
Daddy's little man.
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being .paramount tends to agree with the manner in,which the award
of custody,has, evolved historically.
Ploscowe (1955)feels that divorce has a tremendous impact on
the lives of children and that effort should be made by the parents to
cushionthe shock through proper custody and visitation arrangements.
Dominian':(1968) finds,
... marital breakdown involves more than two adults.
Tl\echildrenof suchma,.rriages, who did not ask to become
either witnesses or pa,.rticipants in some of the bitterest
manifestations .of human intolerance, antagonism and hatred,
pay a very, heavy price. T4ey,'are deprived, through no fault
of their own, of their right to feel secure and loved by the
authors of their life, ,and are frequently manipulated or pushed
to take sides with one party. The much desired and needed
positive image of both parents is distorted beyond recognition
by the real or imaginary grievance s of one of them, which. the
child cannot understand or evaluate. Their loyalty is torn
beyond endurance when, in committing themselves to either
parent, they have to identify thernselves with one point of view
at the expense of the other, only to discover many years later
the dubiousness of their position and at times the complete
falsity of the attitude ,whichthey,were trapped into adopting.
Bernard J. Coughlin, S. J.(1968), Dean, School of Social Ser-
vice, St. Louis University, recently published an article discussing
the r'ights of children, in divorce. He quotes from a United States
Supreme Court Decision ,in·whichJustice Hugo Black opined:
Unfortunately, experience has shown that the question of
custody, so vital to a child' s happiness and well..;being, fre ...
q\lently cannot be left to th,e discretion of the parents. This
is particularly true where. . . the estrangement of husband
and wife beclouds parental judgment with ,emotion and preju,-
dice.
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Despert (1962), a child psychiatrist who has seen many chil-
dren in treatment coping with the meaning of divorce, points out that
in recent year s the nuclear family tends to be smaller and more iso-
lated than in year spast. She feels that this has a strong effect on
children's emotional needs when there is a divorce and ensuing
custody, battle:
Instead of many adults from whom to draw their support and
in whom to invest their love, they are now likely to have only
two ... if indeed they are lucky enough to have both.. Fewer
children. in the family itself. must develop within family
a compensating intensity in.... . relationships.
Glasser and Navarre ( 1967) also stress the fact that in our
present society the iIlcreasing isolation of the nuclear family focuses
the em.otionalneeds on this small group and intensifies the relation-
ships within it. When divorce occur s, the intensity of the relation-
ship between the child and the custodial parent is increased.
The loss of one parent removes a large portion of the
structural balance and intensifies the influence of the remain-
ing parent on the children, while ,possibly limiting the ability
, of this parent to withstand demands made upon her by the
children. There is also a tendency for any family member
to transfer to one or more of the remaining family members
the demands formerly filled by the absent per son. There
would seem to be a danger in the one-parent family that:
,1. The demands of the sole parent for the fulfillment of
individual and emotional needs normally met within the'
marital relationship may prove intolerable and damag~
ing to the children, who are unable to give emotional
support or to absorb negative feelings from this source,
or
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,2. The combined needs of the children maybe intolerable
to the emotionally unsupported solitary parent. Since
the emotional requirements of children are very likely
to take the form of demands for physical attention or
personal service, the remainingpa,rent maybe subject
to physical as· well as emotional exhaustion from this
source.
From a,legal standpoint, Robert W. Hansen (1966), Circuit
Court Judge,' Milwaukee County Family Court Division, feels a child
should be thoug4t of as a third party beneficiary in the marriage con-
tract and the state should provide someone to represent his interests
at the time of divorce. He quotes ,a Bill of Rights of Children
adopted by a group ,of judges in Milwaukee, Wisconsin which contains
several points relating to custody: the right of the child to day-by-
day love, care, discipline, protection by the custodial parent, the
right to know the non-custodial parent, etc.
Hansen and Goldqerg( 1967) in an article on the family court
make a plea for clarification of the role of the social worker in cus-
tody matter s. He feels that too often in, the past the social worker
has operated primarily, as an,investigator and that the social worker
has· a great deal more than this to offer.
As a cllildwelfare expert, he brings to the court a keener
assessment of the child's needs and the alternatives in cus-
tody placement than :would otherwise be available. In addition,
. by givingb;is recommendations at the hearing, he provides a
focal point for testimony and discussion around which the
custody of a child may.be determined. This tends to expedite
matters, so,that a more prompt determination of custody may
.be arrived at. In his relationship ,with the parents, he adds
to their understanding of the child's needs, and he is in a posi-
tion :to g.ive them emotional support and g.uidance.
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III. REASONS FOR DIVORCE
Truxal and Merrill ,(1953) note that it is difficult to assess the
real re1asons for divorce from the legal files. They state:
There is no'way of knowing how many, divorces are granted
on fictitious and how many on bona fide grounds. The nature
of divorce proceedings renders such knowledge impossible to
obtain. Any conclusions -based on the number and percentage s
of divorces g-ranted on the various leg,al grounds, therefore,
should be made -with caution. The behavior measured by such
data is of a special legal character, which often bear s only an
indirect relationship to life. The "real" reasons for the dis-
organization of the familyhy divorce are the tensions and con-
flicts existing between its members. . . and often bear only
a remote relationship to the legal grounds on,which the divorce
is granted.
Meyer Elkin (1962), Supervising .ConciliationCounselor, Con-
ciliation Court of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles,
decrie s the adver sary principle and pleads for a socio-psychological
approach to divorce. He declares thq.t,
Present-clay· divorce courts, hampe-red by archaic and un-
realistic laws, tend to aggravate an already disturb.ed situa-
tion ,instead of providing ,a protective 'and healing atmosphere
for troubled fa1l1ilie s co:rn.ing.witrlintheir jurisdiction. _In
effect, a divorce decree is a family death certificate declar-
ing th<:i.t the m~rriage is deceased. Usually the real reasons
for a divorce are not made known in the statement of alleged
legal reasons; rather they are to 'be found in the character
defects and per sonalinadequacie s of one or both partner s.
In an article appearing ,in the Portland Oregonian ( 1969)1 l\t1ichi-
g,an Judge Stewart A.Newblatt and three other Genesee County Cir-
cuitJudges responded to the question, "What are the real reasons
for divorce? 1,1 asked by- Friend of the Court Robert W. Standal, with
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the following list:
1. The excitement of a new love interest.
2. The monotony of looking after a family that grew too fast
or was started when the parents were very young.
3.. Money, ,when :it' s spent faster than it's earned.
4. Estrangements that sometimes come when a wife goes to
'work, meets new people and finds new interests.
5. The problems arising when husband and wife have different
social or educational backgrounds.
6. Prosperity, which leads some men to feel there will be
no strain ,in taking new mates while making support pay-
ments for the children of their first marriages.
Judge Newb,latt. is further quoted as saying; "The real reasons
(for divorce) never COrne out in a courtroom. The courts are really
.bad places to find .out. II
IV. STATISTICS OF DIVORCE
The statistic sof divorce indicate a problem of ever-increasing
.p.roportions. Nationally, the divorce rate per 1, 000 population has
risen from 2. 3.in 1963 to 2.7 in1967. The 1967 total of 534, 000 di-
vorces granted represented an increase of 8% over 1966 (Statistical
Abstract of the United State s, 1968).
The Bureau oJVitaIStatistics (Portland~ Oregon) recorded for
the State of Oregon that the total number of divorces granted rose
from 6,219,in 1965 to 8,258 in 1968, an increase of 32.8%. The
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total numqer of children·affected by the divorces totaled 7,671 1 in
1965 and 9,863 2 .in· 1968, representing .anincrease of 28.5%.
In Multnornah County, . the site of this study, the population in-
creased according to the Bureau .of Vital Statistics estimates by only
700 persons~etween1965 ·and1968 (555,000 to 555,700), an increase
of O. 1%. Yet the number of divorces increased by 572 from.!, 957 ·in
1965 to 2, 5291n 1968, representingan:increaseof 29.2%.
V. DETERMINATION OF CUSTODIAL PARENT
( Guidelines Used by Courts in Determining·
Best Interests of Child
As pointed out in the introductory chapter "best interests" is a
vague and ill-defined term though Oregon Courts have received some
guidance through the Oregon Supreme Court Decision,. Tingenvs.
Tingen (1968).
In the literature several authors discuss the meaning of this
term. All of the references cite the welfare of the child as the de-
ciding ,factor in the d.eterminationof the custodial parent. But the
welfare of the child is not always a simple matter to determine.
1doe s not include .458 divor ce s where there was no reponse to
.the question, "How ma~y children affected by this divorce?"
2does not include 584 divorces where there was no response to
the question,. "How many children affected by this divorce?"
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Mayer (1967) says,
The crucial determinant in custody.dispute is the welfare
of the child. What will be best for the child? What will best
contribute to his development? What will give him the op-
portunity for th,e "p'l!-rsuit of happiness"? These are the
primary questions before the court.
He lists five criteria considered:
1. Relative i:q.tere st of each parent in child.
2. Their ability to take care of child/ children.
3. How much time they must spend away from child at
work or elsewhere.
4. Physical health.
5. Mental condition.
Mayer (1967) also finds the child's·wishes are relevant, partic-
ularly if the child .has attained some degree of maturity.
Ploscowe( 1955) cites eleven factors which the court may weigh
in determining the child's best interest:
1. relative fitness 0'£ each parent
2. responsibility of that parent for the dissolution of the
marriage and the divorce
3. type of care each parent o.ffers
4. environment in the proposed home
5,. relative economic and social advantages to the child
from being ·:with one parent or the other
6. age, sex, health of the child
7. pre sence or absence of relative s to as sist in caring for
the child
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8. relative ability of the parent to take care of the child
financially
.9. affection of the child for the parent and of the parent
for the c hild:;~
10. preference -of the child
11. presence or abs.ence of facilities for spiritual or
religious. instruction
But even with these guidelines, P10scowe (1955) feels, there
etre too'many unknowns and uncertainties, and judges have wide dis-
cretion. The final result in contested cases of custody, therefore,
"
. may depend as much on the personality of the judge as the
facts of the case. II
Despert .(1962) sums up,the feeling frequently expressed in the
literaturethcat if the best interests of the child were paramount to all
the participants in a divorce action, the problem of custody/would
never come befpre the court. The parents would not need the court
to resolve their differences. The parents, together and.with the help
of counseling agencies, clinics, or private con~ultationswith a
psychiatrist would find thehest solution--that is, best for the child.
As previously noted." hest interests of children· are o.ftendiffi-
cult to determine but P10scowe (1955) found thcat there were certain
guides to which courts generally adhered but from· which they may
. depart. HeenuIrl:erate seigQt general guidelines:
1. Mothers are generally preferred in custody disputes partic-
ular1y .. where very young children are involved.
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Cha,r1e sMetz (1968), a layman obviously bitter from. his ex-
perience ·with the courts, has found this to be true and it forms ·m.uch
of the basis for h,is book de signed to help 'men obtain their rights in
"courts designed for women. "
In an ·article from the Seattle Times (1969), Dr .. E. Lynn
Waldrip,. a psychologist and an llnsuccessful contender for the cus-
todyof his five-year-old daughter, believes the courts :to be preju-
, dicedaga,inst men,in custody ,and too' hasty,in making custody awards
I
to mothers. Waldrip ,is quoted as saying:
There 5i.s ample. evidence in, my own clinical experience,
the experience of mycolleagu,es and hundreds of testimonies
from eitizens,as to the error sbeing m.ade by the present
handling of cu,stody, but tomy,knowledge there has been no
research done on this.
In ,the same article from the Seattle Times (1969LMrs. Alice
Y. Thomas, Acting Administrator of the King County:/ Family,Court,
feels that while she and her staff do not begin their studies with a
fixed idea of which p~rent should have custody, they try to ascertaill
·which parent potentially can give the most to the child. This assess-
ment is not only in material terms but provision for the emotional
. well being of the child ,is considered. She state s, " . . . we thinko.f
the future- --what the circumstances likely:willbe in, the next ten
years." Mrs. Thomas said in most instances the family court does
determine th~t the In.other shall have custody.
Kal and Frum,ess (1961) state that mothers are given
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preference in custody cases involving small children or .older girls.
Ploscowe (1955) notes that historically there was a decided
preference for the father in custody disputes as pointed out in the in-
troductory.section on "History of Divorce. "However, he goes on to
say that presently either by statute or court decision this preference
for the father has been,largely,eliminated.
Both parents are deemed to' be the natural guardians of
their children. Both parents are legally entitled to, the custody
of the child. Both parents are ana plane of equalityin any
custody. dispute concerning. the child.
Despert(1962) agrees that courts favor the mother when the
child is young but that beyond'a certain age which she places at seven
to nine year s, a boy. needs his father.
2. An award of custody is usually made to the successful
party,in,a divorce action.
Kal and Frumess (196l);agree. Mayer (1967) states that the
"fault" criterion ;is extrernely,dangerousand should play. little role
in;the determination of custody. Metz (1968) cites the fact that most
often the· wife will initiate the divorce proceedings and then invari-
ably obtains custody of the children. He encourage s men to ,initiate
divorce proceedings and feels they,.thereby enhance their chances of
obtaining custody, because of the courts' predisposition to award cus-
tody to the successfuJ party,in the divorce action.
3. The preference of a child for a particular parent is not
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conclusive in ,a custody, award.
4. Parents have a superior right to children over grandparents
or other relatives.
Mayer (1967) says that there is no binding rule that a child
must go to the parents, this in a'ccord with the doctrine of giving top
priority to the welfare of the child.
5. Courts do not like divided custody,'arrangements where the
child spends half of the time with mother and half of the
time with father, nor do they look with favor on splitting up
,children.
Mayer (1967) finds that split custody has failed to provide a
satisfactory solution to custodial disputes. He states:
It appears that it is necessary, both psychologically'and
otherwise for the child to have "one home "rather than two.
Of course, this should not affect frequent visitation by the
other parent, which should be granted in all but the rare st
instances.
6. Courts are reluctant to permit children to be taken out of
their area of legal jurisdiction.
7. A court may deem a parent unfit to bring up a child and
deny a parent the right of custody because of his unpopular
political beliefs or unconventional religious views.
Despert (1962) agrees, stating that,
.•. ' a p~rent whose way of life deviates from convention ,is
not fit to rear a child (convention being of course defined by
.the custom of the commun:ity plus the moral code in which the
judge himself was reared).
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8. The courts usua,lly insist upon a right of visitation for the
pa,rent deprived of custody.
VI. MODIFICATION OF DECREE;
CHANGE OF CUSTODY
As established in the Bogh vs. Lumbattis Oregon Supreme
Court Decision (1955) a change of circumstances is essential to ob-
taina modification of the divorce decree in rega,rd to custody. A re-
view of the literature confirms the necessity of defining "change. "
Ka1 and Frumess (1961) note that while most states require a
substantial change of circumstances of the parties to warrant modi-
fication, some states say that a slight change is sufficient. Usually,
on1y.those facts occurring .after the date of the divorce decree may
be heard in a modification hearing. However, the court is not
strictly limited as in other types of cases and can hear any evidence
which will result in benefit to the child.
Reg,arding post-decree modifications oJ custody, Despert(1962)
. COInments that,
... the impression is inescapable that parents who .reopen
a custody agreement in court are generally fighting the same
battle with each other all over again, with the helpless child
as the pawn.
. Is it pos sible for cl;lstodyarrangements at the time of the di-
vorce decree to remain. satisfactory over a long period of time?
Despert (1962) thinks not. She states, "In recognition .either of
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the court's inability to solve the tangled human equation, or of the
unpredictability of human beings, the custody granted by the court is
almost never permane:nt. "
ThomasL. Lodge .(1962) points to some of the same factors in-
valved in changing cu,stody from one parent to the other as were dis-
cussed in Chapter 1. He stresses the fact that "circumstances"
wh,ich justify· a mod,ificationQf decree are not governed by. fixed
standa,rdsj each case must be given ,individual consideration. He
lists the followingfactorswhichmay.influence the court's decision:
1. Unfitness of the custodial parent.
While it is not necessary to prove unfitness of the custodial
pqrent, the pa:rty seeking .achange of custody must demonstrate a
definite deterioration in the conditions which were pre sent at the
time of the original custody award.
2. Imp,rovement of the non-custodial parent's position.
Although changes which show the petitioning parent' s improved
ab,ility.to care for the child are not sufficient in themselves to con- .
stitute a change in circumstances, they may influence the court as a
part of the complete pictu.re.
3. Care given children by the custodial parent.
Health, and school prog-re s s of the child, how he relate s to
peer s, and other considerations are made by the court in forming an
overall p,icture and coming to a decision in regard to the best
will not c·ause the court to discontinue to give preference to the
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mother but that courts
. . . will phrase their justification .for the decision, in
general terms of the welfare 0.£ the child, rather than upon
the theory"that children of tender years should be awarded to
the mother for the "s0lereason that she is the mother. "
8. Preference of the children.
, If the child has reached the "age of discretion" 'his preference
may be considered. The court gives little consideration to the
choice of a younger child since it is felt that he may not be able to
express his true feelings.
CHAPTER III
·METHOD
I. FORMULATING THE STUDY
It was obvious ·from the outset that our subject was one for a
long term program of study. The important questions pertaining ·to
divorce action cannot be answered without a series of studies, of
which the early ones would be exploratory. A number of criteria for
this "Qeginning study,·were spec:ified. The most important ones re-
quire that the study:
1. Relate to some major concepts of the adver sary proceed-
.ings in.order to,focus the study/within some larg.er frame-
work and provide abasis for developing a series of studies
in the particular area of "after divorce. "
2. Involve some kind of formulations that are reasonably ex-
plicit so that the time required for initial conceptualization
would be minimized.
3. Focus upon an area about which there is a lack oJ adequate
information and in which the subject matter of the study
,would not encounter already deeply formed convictions
about the process.
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4.. Require a minimum o.f assumptions about the study and ob-
taindatawhichwollid bring to the fore or support what we
know actually does occur during ,and after divorce.
5. Be of u.se to the court in its further handling of these situ-
ations.
It is our belief that the study meets these criteria and fulfills
group goals by leading the way indescrihing and perhaps improving
the legal program of the court to better meet people I s needs. Group
,disclissionbrought out different aspects of the adversary process
that needed study, such as points at which theory is weak or lacking,
crucial g,aps in: information, etc.
Early. suggestions. included an interview with divorced partners
.and with :the judges o.f the Circuit Court in order to help ,fill in crucial
gaps in information and .to gain, abetter understanding of the legal(
process. Group ,cons:ensus was that interviews with divorced couples
would necessitate dealing with three specific problems: (a) they
;,would demand more time than 'we would he able to devote to them,
(b) there would be difficulty in;locating.people since they may. have
rernarriedor left the city, and (c) it might be difficllit to obtain the
real reasons people' return to court to modify the divorce decree.
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II. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The thesis group believed that information obtained. in inter-
views with the tl~ree Circuit Court judges would be of value in this
study. Such information could cover abroad area and again group
consensu.s considered the limited time which likely, would not permit
sufficient follow through. Future studie s should include knowledge
contributed by the court since it is the judge who makes a decision at
the time of the divorce and ag:ain:later when requests for modification
of decrees are made.
One productive souree o.f information for any study is the know-
ledge of court social·workerswho often'make family studies which
assist the court in reacbing decisions in contested cases. Both our
research advisor and one 0.£ the group ,members -are employed by this
eourtand have given valuable information found in the study. Much
of the ground work ·was laid by, them and g:ave a basis from which we
began the stll.dy. Also, two other members of the group had first
year field placements ,in _the social agency, attached to this court and
g:ained not only experience but many, insights into the workings o.f the
Court of Domestic Relations and some of the problems with which
,the court is faced.
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III. AIMS OF THE STUDY
~Ne hoped to determine whether families share common char-
acteri stic swhichwou..ldallow for identification of potential problem
familie s at the time of the original divorce deer ee; factor s _that bring
_parents into conflict with each other over the children;, the socio-
legal circumstances under which the court awards a change of cus-
tody; and the effects of the court's ruling on the two parents.
The method of collection was that of systematic case analysis.
It was early agreed that case records would constitute the source of
in,formationabout the study: area. Limitations are necessarilyim-
posed on any research design by the choice of source material. The
decision ,to use case records was prompted by the greater economy
of time with this method.
By studying only the legal file sour attention was directed -al-
most solely on the adversary proceedings. One limitation of this
method is that our sample is based upon cases where custody'was
disputed; it does not include cases where custody is agreed upon by
the divorced parents. Other limitations discovered during the study
were:
1. Leg,al filesCire incomplete.
2. Winning attorneys, ,who are responsible for filing legal
documents, do not always comply.
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3. Not all docketed cases are heard.
4. Some m.otionsare denied.
The schedule with code sheet was completed in its first form in
May. A pretest was made and the schedule revised to (a) determine
the variables, the known errors and/or omissions in the files~ ,(b)
provide opportunity .. for g.roup ,members to become more familiar with
the popu,lation to be studied and with the court environment; (c) give
some exp,erience in techIliques, etc. to be used in research, and
(d) show wh(~.t kinds of information could he most useful to the study.
After the third and final draft the group made a trial test to deter-
mine the time involvement for our sample.
In selecting our sample we chose those cases specifically
1abeled "custody" 'by the docket clerk. We took them from both the
judge's,weekly calendar and from the clerk's motion docket. ' All
motions set for a hearing ,which specifically pertain to the issue of
custody during ,1965 ,are included. The final sample includes 92
cases.
IV. THE COURT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY
In the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County oJ
Multnomah, three departments out of the total sixteen departments
have been designated to constitute the Court of Domestic Relations.
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In this composite court, consisting of three judges and their staffs,
are heard, with rare exceptions, all matters relating to divorce,
custody, visitation, ch;ild support, alimony'and adoption.
As p,reviously described, Oregon law provides for continuing
jurisdiction within the Circuit Court over custody of the children of
divorced parents once jurisdiction has been established. This means
that if future changes create dissatisfaction with a past order made
by this court, a remedy maybe sought by returning to that same
court for redress. Either the same ora different judge may hear
and rule on. the problem presented. This ruling is always subject to
review by the Supreme Cou:rt if an appeal is taken.
A problem, is presented to the court in the form of amotion to
modify an existing order; i. e., one of the two pa:rties makes a legal
move requesting ,a change. This is done with the aid 0,£ an attorney.
There is a set procedure by,'whichan attqrney schedules his client's
grievance for a hearing th,rough the Domestic Relations docket clerk.
Due to time variances aparticula:r case maybe set several different
times b,efore it is actually, heard by a judge.
Our sample was taken .from the group of motions scheduled for
hearing duringth,e year 19658 Court activity is recorded by the
docket clerk and kept in ,separate folders by month. Motions set are
entered on one of two different lists, the weekly court calendar for
each judge or the clerk's motion docket, ,according to the amount
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o.f court time reque sted.
v. COLLECTION OF DATA
In collecting data',we elected to follow the order by which :di-
vorce action ,involving custody p;roceeds through the court. All cases
do not necessarily go through each step. There are three distinct
points at which the court 'can appropriately consider custody:
1. After the initial filing of action but before a divo.rce is
granted; termed pendente lite proceedings.
2. At the time the divorce is granted; in the establishing of
the divorce decree.
3. Any time following the granting of the decree and during
the minority of the children; based on a motion by either
parent to modify the decree.
Each step ,in, divorceand/ o.r custody proceedings is accom-
panied by the filing ,of an appropriate set of papers. This legal
"filing" is the instrument which sets the court machinery in motion
and also make s minimal information available to the jurist hearing
the matter. (The rest of the information upon which the jurist bases
h,is decision ,is presented verbally. ) , Each of these sets of papers
contains specified info.rmation, such as the complaint listing the
names and ages of the ch.ildren. As the result of group discussion
.we agreed on the, items of information which we would record from
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each of these sets of papers. To record this information, we drew
up ,a guide or reading schedule (see App.endix A) by which we could
collect the same information in the same way from each individual
case.
After developing the reading schedule a prete st was done in
which ea:ch member of the group read at least one case. We then
met as a group, discussed the problems encountered, clarified rnis-
understandings-and areas of uncertainty. and made minor alterations
in the schedule before proceeding with work on the remaining cases.
The reading was done on an: individual basis with no group ,action
again until this segment of the study, had been completed.
VI. EXPLANATION OF THE
READING SCHEDULE
The Complaint-.;.Item I
A case is begun with the filing of a Complaint in Divorce or
Compla,int in Equity. Either term may be used. This complaint
contains the case num.ber, date of filing, the plaintiff's and defend-
ant's names and sometimes the ages. At this point the party, here-
after to ,be called "plaintiff"is determined. It may be either husband
or wife, .whichever has filed this original complaint. The other
party is hereafter entitled "defendant" throughout the case.
The complaint also contains the date and place of the marriage,
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from which d-atawe computed the length of the marriage. The chil-
dren horn to the marriage and their ages are listed as are the legal
grounds on which the divorce is being sought (refer to Chapter I, pp.
14...; 15). These general "grounds" are supplemented by the recital
of particular o.ffenses relative to the individual case. In the collec-
tion 0.£ data we listed the particulars on the reading schedule by code
number (see Appendix B).
the complaint further contains the plaintiff's allegations to the
court relative to the fitness of each party to be awarded custody 0,£
the children and usually contains a specific: request as to which
parent shall receive this award, or a request that the custody:be
divided and how.
Some rn,entionabout visitation is usually made in the original
complaint. If not, we checked "NR" (not recorded); if the request
was for reasonable visitation, we checked "R";. we cheeked "D"if
the reque st was to, limit visitation to one day at a time; "0" was
checked when a suggestion for visitation involved two or more suc-
cessive days necessitating the children remaining away from home
overnight. We included a category for any special arrangements
suggested.
The complaint usually contains a specific request for child
support and sometimes for alimony. We recorded this by amount
per child per m.onth. Alimony;was recorded according to the
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·individual request: in dollars per month, a lump sum, legal fees.
A subjective judgment about prop,erty.,was made according to
whatever information :was p~ovided in the complaint. If no mention
was made of property, "NR" (not recorded) was checked; "NL" was
checkedwhentherewas none or when it was very limited; "M" (mod-
erate). was checked-when the amount of property fell in a middle
range, such as when the parties owned or were purchasing a house,
car and furniture;, "C" (considerable) was checked for any. amount
above th~t already'mentioned, such as a house, car, furn.itureand
hoat. A further subjective judgment was made about the plaintiff's
request to the court for division of this p,roperty; 1.. e., whether
plaintiff was asking for all, whether it was requested that defendant ~
receive all or at what point on the scale betwe:en these two extreme s
the request for property. divis.ion seemed to the reader to fall.
The Answer--Item II
The Answer to the .:complaint, if filed, is done so by the defend-
ant and may he done so separately or in conjunction :with a cross-
complaint. An answer only admits or denies certain allegations
made in the complaint and a.sks for nothing. Therefore" we recorded
only the date an answer was filed.
The Cross..;Complaint--Item III
The Cros s-complaint is the legal vehicle by which the
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defendant states his case and makes his plea for that which he be~
lieves should be awarded to him. Additional information available
includes the date the cross-complaint was filed and the grounds, both
general and particular, on which the defendant is requesting the
award of the divorce. The defendant's request regarding custody,
visitation, support, alimony and division of the property was col-
lected in the same manner as was done for the plaintiff. The defend-
ant's plea may be the same as or different than the plaintiff's plea in
any or all of these categories.
Show Cause Motion for Action·
Pendente Lite- - Item IV
Due to the leg.ally required time lapse between the date of filing
and first possible date for a court appearance on the divorce matter
itself, some situations require the settling of issues by court order
during this in,terim. (The law requires an interim of 90 days be-
tween the date of filing and the date the decree can be granted. Due
to a change in this particular part of the law in 1965, this time lapse
was only 60 days until September, 1965; thereafter, 90 days.) This
is the first opportunity the court has to make an award of custody
and if done, will be on a temporary basis. Either pa,rty may file ac-
tion demanding that the other party appear in court and show cause
why the court should not make an order relating to a specifically
stated issue, such as support during this interim. We recorded
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which party filed this motion and the date; the information about cus-
tody, visitation, support and alimony,as was stated in this motion
was recorded in, the same manner as had p,reviouslybeen done. In
~
addition we included any requests made for one party to be restrained
from.harrassing the other, ,any request made for one pa,rty,to remove
h;imself from the home, ,any request made for a,ttorney's fees as they
would p,ertain to, this isolated piece of court action only.
Answer to Show",Cause Motion- ... Item V
.If an' Answer to a show cause motionp.endente lite was filed., we
recorded the date of filing only since an answer does not ask for any-
thing, ,but rather simply denies or makes a statement in defense of
the filing party's behavior.
Order Pendente Lite--Item VI
There are two means by which a pendente lite o.rder can been...
tered: (a) one or both parties would be required to appear before the
court for a determination of the issues, or (b) the parties could
reach an independent agreement and stipulate to the entry of an order
based on their agreement without the necessity of a court appearance.
Any.o,rder at this point'wouldp,ertain to the show cause motionwbich
had been filed and· would not affect the original complaint even though
the items ruled on by the court might be the same.
In collecting information we recorded the date this pendente
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lite o,rder' was filed; to whom the .award of temporary .custody was
made--plaintiff, defendant or whether and how an award of split cus-
tody may have been· made; the order regarding visitation (not re-
corded, reasonable, daytime,. overnight, special); the amount of
temporary support ordered; any. alimony ordered; any order restrain-
ing the parties from harrassing each other; any order to move from
the home;. any order regarding. attorney's fee s. If this order was
signed as p.er stipulated agreement of the pa,rties we noted "STIP"
and the date in the margin. At this point a case m.ight be referred
to the Family Cons.ultant's Office, a social agency/adjunct to the
court, for the purposes of a social study relating to an award of cus-
tody in the be st intere sts of the children. If such, a study was or-
dered at this point, we so noted it at the end of the schedule.
Motion to Modify the Pendente
Lite Order- ... Item,.VII
The potential for a change in circumstances is p.res.ent both be-
fore and after the granting of a divorce decree. Therefore a motion
may ,be made to modify any temporary order. When this happened
we noted it in this section and recorded the date such a motion was
filedandby'whom; what the changed custody, visitation or support
plea was; and the particulars about the reason necessitating the
change.
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Order Modifying Pendente Lite
Order--Item. VIII
Such an order could again require an appearance by one or both
parties or could be based on the stipulated agreement between the
parties. We recorded the date and the order as it related to custody,
visitation or support. In the margin we noted if this was done by
stipulation and the date.
The Divorce Decree--Item IX
The Decree is the order which dissolves the marriage and di-
vides the property. It is the second major point at which the court
can consider the matter of custody. The action taken is based on in-
formation provided in the complaint, answer and cross-complaint
and takes into consideration any pendente lite action which has tran ... -·
spired. If the divorce is being heard as a default matter, testimony
is officially recorded by a court reporter, transcribed and becomes
a: part of the legal file. If the action is contested, the litigation is
duly recorded but not transcribed ·and therefore does not become a
part of the legal file. We recorded the date of this decree and the
time lapse, calculated in months, between the filing of the complaint.
and the granting of the decree. We recorded the custody disposition
made (plaintiff, defendant or split and how); the visitation ordered
(not recorded, reasonable, daytime, overnight, special); support in
amount per month per child; any alimony granted.
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If attorney's fees were not asked for we circled n. a. f. on the
reading schedule. We noted how much had originally been requested
and by whom and then noted how much had been awarded and to whom.
A subjective judgment was again made about the amount of property
possessed by the partieswith,a further subjective judgment made
about· where on the continuum b,etween I 'Plaintiff all-..,-...-------
Defendant all 11 the actual court award of property fell.
Motion to Modify Divorce Decree-,:...Item X
This is the third place where the court can consider the matter
of custody. For the court to consider any change in the decree, a
change of circumstances must be shown by the party requesting the
modification. (See Chapter I, pp. 16 -17l) In the affadavit accom-
panyingthe show cause motion certain facts must be spelled out pro-
vidingabasis on :which the court directs the opposing party to appear
and show cause why the decree should not be modified. We recorded
the date of filing of the motion" by,whom and the time lapse in months
between the granting of the decree and this move for a change. We
noted what change 'was requested- -custody, visitation, support or
alimony--andwhat the changed circumstances were which neces-
sitated a review of the decree.
Order Modifying Divorce Decree- -Item.XI
We noted the date of this Qrder and the time lapse in months
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between the date the motion was filed and the date of the amended
order; we noted what the change was.
Family Consultant Activity--Item XII
Marriage counseling services are available through the court.
In the event divorce action 'had already been filed at the time these
conciliation services began a Minute Order advising that counseling
was in process was entered in the divorce file. In collection,of data
we recorded the known cases on which conciliation services were
given by date the service began.
Any Family. Consultant activity in a case was always known and
·was so noted on the reading schedule by date. There were other
points than at the time of a pendente lite order when ,Family Consult-
ant activity could be ordered. Special proceedings to instigate this
service were not necessarily, required, but the date such service
was _instituted was always noted on the cover of the legal file.
Other
This section covered any ,legal activity not specifically covered
by the above eleven sections. If there was an answer to the motion
to modify the decree, it was so noted in this section since space had
not previou,sIY'Qeen provided.
Wefound a number of cases in which more than one action to
modify,the decree was brought. Since no space had been provided on
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the reading schedule to record more than one motion, . any additional
motions were noted in this section with the same information col-
lected as was collected in the original motion to modify.
During the summer months of 1969 the group met individually
to complete the schedules. After completion the group 'again met as
a whole to review the schedules to be certain all pertinent items
were answered. Some information had been omitted and although
these schedules were includedin.the sample, it is noted there were
no modifications made.
VII. SUMMARY
The principal aim of this study:was to find common character-
istics, if any, in the group .of people who ,returned to the court for
resolution of a continuing problem following dissolution of the mar-
riage. We have no knowledge of related studies previously under-
taken and elected to .describe the se familie s. The cause of continu-
ing dis satisfaction,in this group is generally unknown. We chose to
review the legal files of divorce action in an endeavor to determine
whether common d~rioIIlinators did in. fact exist.
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
1. THE SAMPLE
In selecting our sample we chose those case s specifically
labeled "custody" by the docket clerk. We toc>k them from both the
judges' weekly calendar and from the clerk's motion docket. All
motions set for a hearing, which specifically pertained to the issue
of custody during .1965, were included.
The original sample selected totaled 197 case s. Through the
application of the reading schedule to these cases, a number of in-
appropriate cases became apparent. The research director then in-
dividually reviewed each case for its relevancy to the study, prior
to making it available for reading. Eighty-four such cases were so
identified and deleted from the sample, leaving a .reduced sample of
113 cases. Case inspection revealed that these 84 cases were sched-
uled for the purpose of obtaining an interim order pending .actual di-
vorce litigation and were not motions to modify an already existing
o,rder.
In 'Ma.rch·1965 an· administrative decision :was made to change
the terminology on the clerk's motion docket. Instead of using the
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term "pendente lite" to describe those cases in which an interim
order was requested, the more specific terms of "temporary cus-
tody" or "temporary support" were used for easier identification of
the problem by the judge at the time of the hearing. DuringJanuary
and February 1965, SOme cases were termed "pendente lite"
and were not included in our sample. From March through
December 1965, after the change in terminology, these same kinds
of case s were inadvertently included in our sample because of the
keyword "custody. II This change made during 1965 was unknown to
us when the original sample was selected.
Of the remaining 21 cases, 14 were read and included in the
sample at that time, before it was discovered that they had been in-
appropriately identified. Two additional cases were mistakenly
identified and were erroneously included in our sample of 92 cases,
before their lack of relevancy·was noted. Four cases were unavail-
able for reading (one at the Supreme Court, one at the Juvenile
Court, and two missing) and ·are not included in the sam.ple. One
additional case was misidentified, which was a case of legal separa-
tion, rather than divorce. The final sample selected for study was
92 cases.
II. PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
In our sample o.f 92 cases, the divorce was initiated by the
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husband, as plaintiff, in 34 case s, or 370/0 0.£ the sample. The wife
initiated, as plaintiff, in 58 cases, or 630/0 of the sample. In only 28
o.f the case records were the ages of both the plaintiff and the defend-
'ant recorded. At the time of marriage the male parties ranged in
age from 17 to 44.5 years, with a mean age of 23.2 years and a
median age of 21. 2 years. In twelve cases the male parties were
under age 21. The female parties ranged in age from 15to 43 years
with a mean age of 20. 1 years and a median age of 18 years. In ten
cases the female parties were under the age of 18. At the time of
the divorce, the male parties ranged in age from 19 to, 48 years with
a mean age of 31. 1 years and a median age of 29 year s. The female
parties ranged in age from 17 to 44 years with a mean age of 28. 1
years and a median,age of 25 years.
Table I records the places of marriage and the distribution of
the cases according to the place of marriage.
TABLE I
PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Oregon ' Washington Other Total
Vancouver,
Portland Other Stevenson Other
27 5 35 6 16 89~:c
~:cThree cases listed no place of marriage.
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The number of marriages in the Vancouver-Stevenson, Wash-
ington area exceeds that of Po.rtland. An explanation for this is that
prior to 1965 it was possible to'marry in these Washington cities
without the usual three-day waiting period and the requirement of a
blood test, which,was mandatory in the State of Oregon.
Figures 1 through 6 provide a graphic representation of the
lengths from the date of marriage to the various legal actions and
the time lapses involved from one court action to another.
Figure 1 sh0ws that in the sample studied nearly one-third of
the marriages ended within the first five years. This wOllld seem to
correlate with the national trend, although the United States Bureau
of the Census (1969) does not record this. Dominian (1968) states
that although statistics differ, "... they'are all in agreement that
divorce has a high incidence in the early years of m.arriage, which
appears to be the critical phase. II
Speculationa.s to reasons for this are as follows:
This is the period of initial adjustment stress. It is the time
when the young ,marital partners seek to fuse identities, in the
Erikson (1950) sense, and frequently find that they are not suffi-
ciently mature for this kind of intimacy and responsibility. They
':
may lack, in E~ikson'swords,
... the capacity to commit themselves to concrete
affiliations and partner ships and to develop the ethical
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strength to abide by such commitments. . . which call
for significant sacrifices and compromises.
This is the time when children are born, financial pressures
are frequently heavy, and if one or both partners lack the capacity
for mature growth and problem- solving, the marriage may be termi-
nated by divorce.
Figure 2 indicated that in 70 out of the 92 case s studied, di-
vorce was completed within nine months after the initial filing.
Speculation concerning this is that:
1. After a couple has filed for divorce the decision to follow
through is generally made.
2. Divorce is- a -speedier proces s than public opinion usually
considers it. Even though this is a sample of the more
difficult cases,which _would presumably take longer to pro-
ce s s, in 77% the decree was g ranted within nine months of
the filing date. Only 22 of these cases were carried beyond
the nine .. month period.
As noted in Figure 3, the length of marriage from the date of
marriage to the divorce decree ranged from 13 months to 25.6 .
years with a mean length of 9.55 years and a median of 8.3 years.
It is interesting to observe how the median of our sample compares
to the median duration of marriage in the State of Oregon in 1965 of
5.9 years, or 2.4 years less than our sample (Bureau of Vital
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,Stati stic s).
Figure 4 shows that in 67% of the cases studied the time lapse
from the filing of the Divorce Complaint to last court action was five
years or less. In 27% the time lapse was between five and ten years,
and 6% of the case s studied continued the courtroom conflict for
longer than ten year s.
This does not mean that the latter cases were necessarily in
constant court conflict during the entire period. For many people
the court is seen as a resource for help in problem-solving; they
tend to return to the court only when they cannot cope with problems
alone.
The fact that 6% of these cases continued courtroom conflict
for periods longer than ten years may be explained in the following
'ways:
1. The family may have continued in conflict throughout the
entire ten-year period.
2. The family'who sees the court as a problem-solving re-
source maYQe returning for help -after a period of years
during which there was no court action.
3. The parents maybe responding to a child's manipulation,
or to the changing needs of the child, in seeking a change
of custody after a ten-year period.
Our feeling is that since human conditions are not static, a
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Figure 5 points out the fact that a marriage relationship doe s
not end with divorce, contrary to public opinion that when the divorce
decree becomes final the marriage ties are automatically dissolved.
It is shown here that in the sample studied the relationship continued
long ,after the divorce. It is also shown that people returning to
court have had wide ranges in length of time of relationship ,when
both marriage and divorce a,re considered.
Another way of looking at the continuation of the relationship
'after the divorce is in terms of what Blanck and Blanck (1969) refer
to as "the psychological process of terminating object relations. "
The se author s feel that" . . . the matter of seve ring tie s to
the partner is of far greater importance than is usually considered, "
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and that a gradual tapering off of emotional attachment (largely on an
unconscious level) is necessary before the divorced partners· are able
to reinvest psychic energy in the development of new interests and
interpersonal relationships.
III. THE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE, THE BILL OF
PARTICULARS, AND THE CHANGED
CIRCUMSTANCES
There must be legal grounds on which the divorce is being
sought. As mentioned in Chapter III, the se general "grounds" are
supplemented by the recital of particular offenses relative to the in-
dividual case. The Grounds for Divorce in the original complaint
listed "cruel and inhuman treatment" in 89 cases, "desertion" in 2
cases, and "incarceration in a state penal institution" in 1 case.
Although the legal grounds on which 89 divorces were based
carne under the heading "cruel and inhuman treatment, " there is a
long list of particulars under this heading.
I.The fact that the law requ!lr1e s that one party be "innocent" and
the other "guilty, "makes for a stilted and stereotyped repetition of
legal terms of abuse throughout the cOllrt r,ecords studied. The legal
wording in the original complaint which is served to the defendant in
a divorce case probably propels more people into court than any
other single thing.
The Bill of Particulars in the a,riginal com.plaint was divided
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into 13 major categories of particulars in our reading guide. The
various lettered particulars were reported 260 times with a range of
o to 6 pCl-rticulars per case, with a mean of 2.8 per case and a
median of 3per case. Figure 7 reveals the frequency of use for each
category, and the sex of the reporting party.
Large groupings of cases were found around the particulars of
E (physical abuse), F (verbal abuse), and M(other). It appeared
that these particulars could be further specified for greater clarity
and it was decided that Physical Abuse, Verbal Abuse and Other
would be divided into sub-categories. Figures 8, 9, and 10 show
the frequency.:with ;which each of these sub-categories was used.
Most charges of physical and verbal abuse were made by the
wives against their husbands. "Late hours" was charged against the
husbands by the wives in 13 instances, while the husbands made the
same charge in only 2 instances.
There were 32 Cross Complaints with the Grounds for Divorce
listed as "cruel and inhuman treatment" in 30 cases,. "desertion" in
1 case, and the "marriage not legal" in 1 case.
Of the 32 Cross Complaints, 27 reported a Bill of Particulars
with the various particulars listed 94 times with a mean of 3. 5 par-
ticulars per case and a median of 3 per case. Figure 11 shows the
particulars listed in the Cross Complaint with the sex of the report-
·ingparty.
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The charge s in the Complaint and Cro s s Complaint by the
plaintiffs anddeferidants do not appear to have much variation. It
was observed that in the Cross Complaint no,wives made the charge
of "paramour" against their husbands, whereas 13 plaintiff -wive s
listed this in the complaint.
In our inve stigationof the Cro s s Complaint we again found
large groupings of cases around the particulars of "Verbal Abuse"
(F), and "Other "(M). "Physical Abuse "(E) was reported on three
occasions as an assault, and in one case the form of physical abuse
was not specified. The particulars of "Verbal Abuse" (F) and
"Other" (M) were again divided into sub-categories as shown in
Figures 12 and 13.
We found that when the divorced husband filed a Motion for
Modification of the Divorce Decree, there were 15 charges of '!im-
moral behavior" or "man in the home, " 28 charges of "neglect
and/ or abuse of the children, " 6 case s of the voluntary surrender of
the children:by the divorced wife, 6 cases where no reason:was
given, 1 case ·where a child requested a change of custody to her
father ~ and· 1 case in which the father stated he could provide a bet-
ter home for the children than their mother was providing.
When the divorced wife filed the Motion to Modify the Divorce
Decree, there were 7 charges of "neglect and/ or abuse of the chil-
dren, " 2 voluntarYi surrenders of custody. by the father, 2 cases with
Argumentative
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Vile and Profane Language
Berating Remarks
Unspecified
14
12
3
3
1
4
I I
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Figure 12. Sub-categories of particular F, verbal abuse.
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Figure 13. S'tb-categories of particular M, other.
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no reason given, and 1 case of a mother who ,requested custody be-
cause her ex-husband would not comply with the Divorce Decree in
allowing her to visit the children.
Due to the inconsistencies in data gathering and court records,
and since our study of subsequent motions did not add any new cate-
gories that were not found in the first Motion to Modify the Divorce
Decree, we did not go beyond the first motion.
The particular stated most frequently by husbands (second
most frequently by wives) is "loss of love." This implies a feeling
that love had existed at one time within the marriage, but had been
lost. This may also imply a feeling on the part of the spouse that
love is something :to be sought outside the marriage or within a sub-
sequent marriage, as an object, rather than as an outgrowth of a re-
lationship based on mutual consideration and respect.
The idea of the "role oriented vs. the goal oriented" outlook
as presented by Glasser (1970), seems applicable in relating to the
various reasons for divorce given in the complaints studied. Ac-
cording to this premise, our current society is more concerned with
role identity, with personal fulfillment and the need to feel loved and
worthwhile, than it is concerned with survival or the attainment of
goals. Thus, in marriage, people are seeking personal satisfaction
more than they were in the days when marriage was based on prac-
tical aspects of survival, when spouses worked together toward
83
common goals,. with little leisure left to consider whether or not the
marriage was fulfilling ina personal sense. In today's marriages,
partner s expect to identify ide'ologic_ally as well as biologically.
IV. CHILDREN
A descriptive analysis of the children of the parties involved in
custody changes seems appropriate before actually considering cus-
tody changes. The 92 families in our sample had a total of 207 chil-
drenwitha range of zero .to seven children per family. The children
unborn at the time of filing for the divorce were counted as "0" for
statistical purposes. This figure does not indicate the exact number
of children, since 18-year-olds are not usually mentioned in the Di-
vorce Decree. There was one instance where an l8"year-,oldwas
reported and in this case the person was not listed in the frequency
distribution for family size. It should also be noted that at times
stepchildren are not recorded in the case record because they are
not part of the "legal" family. There is, therefore, no way of ac-
curately reporting .exact totals of children per family. Table II, the
frequency distribution of family size, does indicate that of the sample
available the rneanwas 2.2 children per family, and a median of 2
children per family.
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TABLE II
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY SIZE
Family Size
0-1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Frequency 31 28 19 10 3 0 1
·92
Percentage 33. 7 30.4 20. 6 ·10.9 ,3.3 0 1. 1
Range:
N:
Mean:
Median:
o (unborn) to 7
207
2.2 children/family
2
The mean family size for all couples divorced in the State of
Oregon .in, 1965 having one or more children was also 2. 2 (Bureau of
Vital Statistics,).
TABLE III
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: FAMILY SIZE OF
ALL COUPLES DIVORCING IN OREGON IN 1965
(FAMILIES WITH NO CHILDREN EXCLUDED)
Family Size
1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ Total
Frequency ,1264 1094 633 321 113 42 29 3496
Percentage 36.2 31. 3 18. 1 9. 2 3. 2 1.2 .8
Mean: 2. 2
Median: 2
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We, therefore, developed a hypothesis that our sample was no
,different than the couples having one child or more, who were di-
vorced in Oregon. in 1965. indirect relationship to the size of the
families of the two groups. A comparison of the two groups was
made by' means of Chi Square. The Chi Square of the sample was
2. 05. Chi Square at the. 05 level with 6 degrees of freedom is
12.59. Th,erefore, the difference was not statistically significant
and the hypothesis of there being no ·difference between the groups
was accepted. The results of the Chi Square comparison are shown
in Table IV.
TABLE IV
CHI SQUARE: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE FAMILY SIZE
WITH THAT OF THE FAMILY SIZE OF ALL DIVORCED
COUPLES IN OREGON IN 1965
Family Size h
0-1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Sample 31 28 19 10 3 0 1 92
Oregon 1264 1094 633 321 113 42 29 3496
Total 1295 1122 652 331 116 42 30 3588
2 2. 05 2 6 df = 12. 59X sample = X .05,
.' While our study encompassed only 92 families involving cus-
tody proceedings during the year 1965, the total number of divorcing
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families for the entire state of Oregon for the same year was 3,496.
The figure increases dramatically'when the total number of members
of extended families touched by divorce are added to this:
Numb.er of families touch.ed by divorce:
Number of children touched by divorce:
Total member s of nuclear family:
. Nuclear family + grandparents:
Nuclear family + grandparents + stepparents:
14,661
28,641
35,629
The point made here is that since divorce influences so many
lives in,our society in so direct away, society must deve1op,a more
enlightened approach toward divorce and its concomitant problems.
Of the total population of children in the sample, 101 were
males, or 48.8%, and 106 were females, or 51. 2% of the total. The
age s of the children ranged from unborn to age 17. Ages of five
children were not recorded in the case records and one 18-year-01d
was not listed in our statistical computations, leaving ,an N (total) of
201 children. Table V shows the distribution of the children's ages
at the time of filing.
Since there was often more than one child per family, and the
range of ages was great, the value of a mean 'was considered ques-
tionab1eand, therefore, was not computed.
1Figures taken from the Bureau of Vital Statistics (Portland,
Oregon); other figures are projected.
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TABLE V
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN'S AGE
AT TIME OF FILING DIVORCE COMPLAINT
Age
o
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total = 201
f
3
26
17
14
17
12
15
,15
16
Age
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
f
12
9
10
8
8
10
2
4
3
Range:
, N:
Mean:
o (less than 6 months) to 17 (one 18-year-
old not included)
201
Not computed
The age of the younge st child at the time of filing ranged from
unborn to 14 years with two children unborn at the time of filing.
The mean age of the younge st child in each divorcing family
was 4.2 years with a median of 3 years. Table VI shows the fre-
quency distribution of the youngest child at the time of filing.
Table VI suggests various lengths of time in which families can
remain engaged in adver sary p!oceedings. Out of the sample studied,
two families can stay engaged in adversary process for 21 years;
twenty- seven families for 20 years; forty, families (with children age
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TABLE VI
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD
AT TIME OF FILING DIVORCE COMPLAINT
Age f Age L
0 2 9 3
1 27 10 2
2 11 11 2
3 8 12 1
4 8 13 0
5 6 14 2
6 .. 9 15 0
7 6 16 0
8 2 17 0
Range:
N:
Mean:
Median:
o (unborn) to 14
89 (2 cases without ages; one child 18)
4.2 years
3 years
two and below) for 19 years. The latter groupconstitute s a total of
43. 5% of the population studied.
V. CUSTODY CHANGES
Custody is here defined as legal custody and not necessarily
physical custody. For example, in a few cases we found situations
where a child was living with one parent while the other parent had
legal custody, as defined by the court.
We found that there Were 43 cases in which there was no
change of custody, 24 cases of one change, 21 cases of two changes,
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3 cases of three changes, and 1 case of four changes of custody.
Figure 14 shows the location .of the custody changes witb;in the
legal proce s s and the frequency of each ,individual legal action wi thin
the proce s s.
It is shown here that out of 41 court actions prior to the divorce
decree, only 6resultedi;n change of custody. This seems to imply
that the court does not readily make change in clistodybefore grant-
ing the divorce. The figure also shows that nearly half (43%) of
first Orders Modifying the Divorce Decree resulted in custody
change. After the influx of first motions to modify, there is a sharp
drop .in subseque~t requests for modification.
This action shown by the court concurs with our feeling that the
period just before and during the granting of the divorce decree is a.
time of great stress and emotional unheaval for the people involved;
therefore, a cooling-off period allows for calmer and more rational
a,ttitudes on the pq.rt of both parents. The parents would be likely to
be more amenable to planning for "the be st inte re sts of the child"
after the strong feelings involved during the divorce have subsided.
This figure shows that only a negligible number of families
comeback into court after the third modification order. There are
several possible explanations for this:
1. The people involved may have become more stabilized in
their life patterns by this time. They may have developed
Order Pendente Lite
Modification of Pendente Lite
Divorce Decree
o
13
90
Total number
of individual
, court actions
34
7
92
Fir st Modification Order
Second Modification Order
Third ModificationOrde'r
Fourth Modification Order
Fifth Modification Order
Sixth Modification Order
Seventh Modification Order
o
o 5 10 15 20 25 30
35
35
78
35
18
12
5
2
2
Figure 14. Location of custody changes within the
legal process.
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new interests and relationships with other people.
2. They may desire more court litigation but be unable to
afford attorney fee s.
3. They may find it difficult to find an attorney who will
handle their case.
4. The children involved in, custody dispute may have attained
their majority.
5. The ex- spouses may be separated by great geograph,ical
distanc'es and be less inclined to engage in continuedlitiga-
tion.
We were intereste'd in looking at the possibility of a direct rela-
tionship between the number of custody change s and the ages of the
children at the time of filing. We had developed a hypothesis that
children ,in their teen year swere more liable to change custody than
those of a younger age. We investigated the hypothesis by'means 0.£
Ch,i Square. The computed Chi Square of our sample was 30.89.
Chi Square at the. 05, level with.20 degrees o.f freedom is 31. 41, in-
dicating no significance. Our hypothesis was disproved and we
found the age of the child to be insignificant in relation to custody
change s. The re suIts of the Chi Square computation are shown in
Table VII.
There were 103 children that did not actually change custody,
although custody,was at question in the legal suit. Sixty-eight
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TABLE VII
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE OF
CHILDREN AT TIME OF FILING AND
NUMBER OF CUSTODY CHANGES
Age at Number of Custody Changes
Filing 0 1 2 3 4 Total
0- 2' 22 18 5 0 1 46
3
- 5 25 15 3 0 0 43
6
- 8 28 9 6 3 0 46
9 - 11 15 8 7 1 0 31
12 - 14 6 16 3 1 0 26
15 - 18 7 2 0 0 0 9
Total 103 68 24 5 1 201
2
sample = 3 o. 89 2 5 20 df == 31. 41X X .0,
children were involved in one change; 24 were involved in two
changes; 5,were changed on three occasions; and 1 child was involved
in four custody changes.
Tables VIn and IX show the sex and age of those children who
had one and two custody changes and the parent who received custody.
It should be noted thq.t the children are listed strictly. by the
number of custody changes and they are listed at each instance in
,which there was a change in custody. Therefore, some children are
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TABLE VIII
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: AGE OF CHILDREN AT
FIRST CUSTODY CHANGE AND PARENT TO
WHOM CUSTODY WAS GRANTED
Age of Child
16 and
Parent Child 0-3 4-6 7~9 10-12 13-15 ,above Total
Father f - Male 5 5 6 7 13 5 41
f - Female 0 7 4 7 3 7 28
Mother f - Male 4 1 2 2 , 0 1 10f - Female 2 2 0 3 I 2 2 11
Male to father:
Female to father:
Mean 10. 7 years; Median 11 years.
Mean,II.3 years; Median 11 years.
Male to mother: Mean 6.9 years; Median 6.5 years.
Female to mother: ,Mean' 9.7 years; Median 11 years.
counted more than once. It is interesting to note that in the first
change in custody, there,was a distinct mode of 13 boys in the 13- to
15-year-old interval, who changed from the custody of the mother to
the father.
The figures shown in· Table VIII suggest the fact that society
as embodied in the Circuit Court Judge s feel that mother s should
have custody of infant girls, and that teen....;age boys frequently,belong
with their fathers. This is in line with our knowledge of theory re-
garding the developmental needs of children and is largely, supported
by the literature reviewed in this study. The judges in the
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TABLE IX
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: AGE OF CHILDREN AT
SECOND CUSTODY CHANGE AND PARENT TO
WHOM CUSTODY WAS GRANTED
Age of Child
16 and
Parent Child 0... 3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 above Total
Father f - Male 0 2 2 1 0 1 6f - -Female 0 0 2 3 2 0 7
Mother f - Male a 2 a 1 4 1 8
f - Female a a 4 2 3 1 10
Male to fathe r : _Mean 9. 1 year s; Median 8.5 years.
Female to father: Mean 11. 4 years; Median ·12 years.
Male to mother: . Mean 11. 5 years; Median 13 years.
Female to mother: Mean 11. 7 years; Median 12 years.
Multnomah County Court of Domestic Relations also serve as Juve-
nile Court Judges where they see a great many cases involving de-
linquent boys whose mother s are unable to cope with the develop-
mental needs of their adolescent sons; thus, the judges are made
constantly' aware of this problem, especially, as it occurs where the
mother is the sale parent.
Table IX shows that at the time of the second change in custody,
the number of change s by sex of parent and by sex of child are more
in balance than they,'werein Table VIII. This maybe due to the fact
that the most heated part of the dispute has subsided; change in
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circumstances required by· law to effect change in custody no longer
must be as grossly significant as formerly and the focus is more
likely to be on the real needs of the child. By the time of the second
custody change, both parties have been through the court and their
situations have been ,documented; they. are by this time well ac-
quaintedwith the court process.
The third change in custody involved six children. One girl,
age 12, went from the custody of the mother to the father. Custody
of the five remaining children went to the mother frOIn the fathers
and these children included two boys, ages 12 and 19, and three
girls,. ages 10, 12 and 17. A fourth change in custody involved a
girl, age 12, who returned to the custody of her mother. It is inter-
esting that this child changed custody from the mother to the father,
back to the mother, returned to her father, and finally returned to
her mother. Thus, there were four changes of custody resulting in
the child returning to her starting point in the custody of the mother.
We suspected that there ,was a relationship between the length
of marriage and the number of changes in custody. Simple observa-
tion of our data seemed to indicate that the shorter the marriage, the
more difficulty in settling the matter of custody. We, therefore,
developed the hypothesis that there was an inverse relationship be-
tween the length of marriage (time lapse from date of marriage to
date of filing) and the number of custody changes. Comparison was
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made by means of Chi Square. The computed Chi Square of our
sample was 9.62. Chi Square at the. OS,level withl2degrees of
freedom is 21. 03, indicating no significance to the relationship. Our
hypothesis was disproved and therefore the length of marriage is not
a significant variable in relationship to the number of custody
changes. Table X presents t4eseresults.
TABLE X
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH OF MARRIAGE
TO FILING OF DIVORCE COMPLAINT AND
NUMBER OF CUSTODY CHANGES
Length of
Marriage Changes
(months) 0 1 2 .3 4 Total
o - 43 Q 1 12 7 3 0 1 23
44 - 97
·Q2 ·10 7 4 2 0 23
'98 ... 171 Q3 10 6 7 0 0 23
172 - 290 Q 4 10 4 7 1 0 22
Total 42 24 21 3 1 91
2
sample = 9.62 2.05, 12 df = 21. 03X X
Note: One case with no original date of m.arriage.
It should be noted in, Table X that there are 23 cases in each"of
the first three quartil.es and 22 cases in the fourth quartile, for a
total 0.£ 91 cases. One case from. our original sample of 92 cases
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had to be eliminated in our computations involving the length of mar-
riage(£rom the date of marriage) because the date of the marriage
was missing from this case record.
At the time of filing the assumption was made, unless othe:t1-
wise noted, that the party, requesting custody/ had the physical custody
of the children. Table XI shows the distribution of custodythroug4-
out the legal process.
TABLE XI
DISTRIBUTION OF CUSTODY THROUGH THE LEGAL PROCESS
Pendente First Final
Filing Lite Divorce Order Order
Wife 69 70 72 53 53
Husband 18 16 14 31 30
Split 3 2 4 8 8
Court 1 1 1 0 1
Other 1 3 1 0 0
Table XI partially substantiates findings in the literature, i. e. ,
mothers generally obtain custody of children at the time of the di-
vorce. However, these figures also show the number of fathers get-
ting custody at the time of the first order modifying the decree more
than doubled over those who had it at the time of the divorce.
There is more split custody shown here (8 out of the total 92 in
the final order) than the review 0'£ literature led us to expect. This
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maybe explained by the fact that children choose sides to some ex-
tent when the nuclear family is divided. This is another instance
where the court must individu(llize and make specific plans .to fit
each family' situation.
Another factor to be considered is that as children reach
adole scence they tend to, identify more strongly:withthe parent of the
same sex. In a family, where there are children of each sex there
is more likely to be split custody, if the court adheres to.this
natur al identification proce s s.
In examining the sex of the plaintiff in relationship, to custody,
we found that of the 34 plaintiff husbands, 15 did not requ,est custody
at the time of filing, although, after the filing this same group was in-
volved in requesting custody. We also found one case of a plaintiff-
wife who ,indicated at the time of filing that it was her wish,that her
husband be granted custody. A further breakdown of the distribution
of custody to the husbands through the legal proce s s is available in
Table XII.
The number of husbands who had custody more than doubled
from the time of the Divorce Decree to the fir st Order Modifying the
Divorce Decree.
It can be ;seenhere tha,t 26. 5% of the plaintiff husbands have
custody at the time of the divorce decree, while 8.6% of the defend-
ant husbands have custody. This would indicate that Metz's (1968)
99
TABLE XII
DISTRIBUTION OF CUSTODY TO HUSBANDS
DIVIDED BY PLAINTIFF /DEFENDANT
First Final
Custody Divorce Order Order
Plaintiff All 9 14 14
Husband Split 2 3 3
Defendant All 5 17 16
Husband Split 2 5 5
assertion that courts tend to award custody to the plaintiff is essen-
tially, correct. The trend still holds true at the time of the final
order:
41. 2% plaintiff husbands had custody.
27.6% defendant husbands had custody.
We believe there is an,origina1 distortion which skews the
figures and tends to support Metz's position when in fact this position
may not 'Qe accurate. There is societal sanction given for women to
file for and obtain the divorce. Instances where the husband is the
plaintiff may well be those situations where the wife does not want
the children or where her conduct has been such that the husband's
legal position ,is stronger. Therefore, even though statistics tend to
support Metz' s position we suspect his statement concerning hus-
bands as plaintiffs is not completely, defensible.
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In considering the above observations we felt that there seemed
to be a relationship between the sex of the plaintiff and the number of
custody changes. We drew the hypothesis that plaintiff-husbands
stood a better chance of ultimately obtaining custody than did the
plaintiff-wives. Chi Square was computed in o.rder to examine this
hypothesis. The computed Chi Square of our sample was 2. 07. Chi
Square at the. 05 level with.4 degrees of freedom is 9.49, indicating
no, significant difference between the plaintiff-husbands and plaintiff-
wives. Thus, the sex of the plaintiff is not significant in relation to
,who ,receives custody, or the number o.f custody changes. (Table XIII)
TABLE XIII
CHI SQUARE: RELA TIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX OF PLAINTIFF
AND NUMBER OF CUSTODY CHANGES
Custody Change s
0 1 2 3 4 Total
Husbands 14 10 8 2 0 34
Wives 29 14 13 1 1 58
Total 43 24 21 3 1 92
2 2X sample = 2. 07 X .05, 4 df =9.49
Despite the fact that custody for husbands more than ,doubled
from the time of the Divorce Decree to the fir st Order Modifying
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the Divorce Decree, the proportion of custody changes was not signi-
ficantly different for plaintiff-husband or plaintiff-wive,s.
A final hypothesis·was"developedand tested, which considered
the size of families in relationship to the number of custody changes.
Our hypothesis was that the greater the number of children in a
family, the more the number of custody changes. Chi Square was
again used in te sting the relationsh,ip. The computed Chi Square of
our sample was 13'.19. Chi Square at the. OS.level with 16 degrees
of freedom is 26.30, indicating no significant differences between the
size of families and the number of custody changes. Thus, there is
no significance in our samp.le to indicate that larger familie shave
more custody changes. Table XIV shows the results of the Chi
Square computation.
TABLE XIV
CHI S.QUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY
SIZE AND CUSTODY CHANGES
Custody Children per family
Changes 0..;1 2 3 4 5-7 'Total
0 13 12 11 6 1 43
1 9 10 3 1 1 24
2 7 6 3 3 2 21
3 1 0 2 0 0 -3
4 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 31 28 19 10 4 92
X
2
sample 13. 19 2 16 df = 26.30= X . OS,
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In reviewing this table, suggested reasons why our hypothesis
that the greater the number of children ina family, the more the
nu:rnber of custody changes, was proved incorrect, are as follows:
In large families affected by divorce, frequently there is not
enough money for continued court litigation. Also, in the larger
families, it would be more difficult to shift children from one house-
hold to another from the standpoint of space, as well as the addi-
tional stress involvedinimoving several children from one horne to
another.
VI. ACTIONS
For our purposes each Roman numeraled section heading in the
reading guide and all subsequent motions and order s for modification
of the Divorce Decree,. after the first Order, are defined as "court
actions. "
Because of the legal requirement that a complaint be filed for
divorce, our sample of 92 cases contained a complaint in each case.
This is also true regarding the Divorce Decree. However, there is
not the same degree of consistency in the filing of other legal docu-
mentswithin the record. In some instances of court action we ex-
pecteda hearingand/ or motion prior to the court action, but there is
in these instances no record in the legal file of a motion or hearing.
Figure 15 shows the legal process and the freqll.ency of each
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Figure 15. The legal process and the frequency of each
court action.
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court action.
The num.ber of legal actions involved in the individual case s of
our sam.ple ranged from. 3 to 19 with a mean of 7. 1 actions and a
median of 6 actions per case.
Although the difference is not great, Figure 15 shows that
there is a. trend after the divorce decree for m.ore m.otions than or-
ders. This may indicate that some people may have learned ways to
re solve their problem.s over tim.e without the intervention of the
court; although the m.otions are filed by attorneys, some parents may
have learned to negotiate or to bring about changes in such a way that
they do not have to return to court.
In our study of the legal process a number of hypotheses were
developed in regard to a relationship of the num.ber of court actions
with such variable s as fam.ily size, length of m.arriage, custody
changes, and the number of court actions before the issuance of the
Divorce Decree with the number of court actions after the Divorce
Decree was issued.
Our first hypothesis was that the larger the fam.ily, the m.ore
the num.ber of court actions. The developm.ent of this hypothe sis
was somewhat a re suIt of our consideration of fam.ily size and the
num.ber of custody changes, since both hypotheses were developed at
the sam.e time. A com.parison was made by means' of Chi Square
between one- and two-child fam.ilies and those with three children or
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more to determine whether there was a relationship between family
size and the number of court actions. The computed Ch,i Square of
our sample was 2.20. Chi Square at the. OS, level with 7 degrees of
freedom is 14. 07, indicating no significant difference between, the
two groups. Thus, the family size is not a significant factor in the
number of court actions. Table XV shows these resu,lts.
TABLE XV
CHI SQUARE: RELA TIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY SIZE
AND THE NUMBER OF COURT ACTIONS
Family Actions
Size 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11 ..; 1 2 13 - 14 17 - 18 19 - 20 Total
0 2 15 16 11 9 4 2 1 1 59
3 - 7 9 11 4 4 2 2 1 0 33
Total 24 27 15 13 6 4 2 1 92
Note: There were no cases in the 15..; 16 'action .interval.
X
2
sample = 2.20
2
X • OS, 7 df = 14.07
The second hypothesisltested~ simply stated~ was that the
longer the couple was married, the better the chances of fewer ap-
pearances before the court and thus, the fewer the number of court
actions. We considered the length of marriage from the date of the
marriage to the filing for the divorce and related this time lapse to
the number of court actions. Chi Square was again computed. The
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computed Chi Square of our sample was 14. 14. Chi Square at the
. 05 level with 12 degrees of freedom is 21. 03. Again, no signifi-
cance was found in the relationship. Therefore, the length of mar-
riage has .little effect on the number of court actions. Table XVI
shows the re suits of the Chi Square computation.
TABLE XVI
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH OF
MARRIAGE TO FILING OF DIVORCE COMPLAINT
AND NUMBER OF ACTIONS
Length of
Marriage Actions
(months) 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-19 Total
o - 43 Q 1 5 5 5 6 2 23
44 - 97 Q2 9 5 4 l' 4 23
98 - 171 Q3 .3 10 4 4 2 23
172 - 290 Q4 7 6 2 2 5 22
Total 24 26 15 13 13 91
Note: One case not used because of no original marriage date.
2
= 14. 14
2
. as, 12 df =21. 03X sample X
The la st hypothe si s te sted the relationship between the number
of court actions and the number of custody changes. Our hypothesis
was that the more the court actions, the more the custody changes.
The computed Chi Square of ou,r sample was 19. 31. Chi Square at
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the. 05.leve1 with 16 degrees of freedom is 26.30, which disproved
our hypothesis (Table XVII).
TABLE XVII
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER
OF COURT ACTIONS AND CUSTODY CHANGES
Custody Actions
Changes 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-19 Total
0 11 13 6 6 7 43
1 10 7 4 1 2 24
2 3 6 5 .4 3 21
3 0 1 0 1 1 3
4 0 0 0 1 0 1
Total 24 27 15 13 13 92
2 19.31 2 16 df ::: 26.30X sample::: X .05,
Here again it is clearly seen ,that the court seeks to remain ob-
jectiveand to decide each case on.its individual merits. The table
shows that there is no correlation between the number of court ac-
tions and the number of actual custody changes. The court is not in-
fluenced by the increase in number of actions but makes it decisions
in a calm and rational manner based on the continued best interests
of the child.
It became apparent in our study of the legal proce s s that a
number of the marital parties in our sample spent more time
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. involved in the legal proceeding s than they had. in actual months
married. It was decided to, look at this group,andinvestigate any,re-
lationships Qetweenthis group 'and other aspects of our study.
This group consisted of 29 cases. Tables XVIII through XXI
provide a graphic representation of the time elapsed from the date of
marriage to the various legal actions and the time elapsed from one
court action to' another.
TABLE XVIII
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: LENGTH OF MARRIAGE
TO FILING OF DIVORCE COMPLAINT
Year f Year f
1st 2 5th 2
2nd 9 6th 4
3rd 5 7th 2
4th 5
Range: 3 months to 6. 8 year s
N: 29
Mean: 3. 1 years
Median: 3 year s
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TABLE XIX
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: LENGTH OF LEGAL PROCESS
Year f Year f
1st 0 9th 2
2nd 1 lOth 5
3rd 4 11th 1
4th 3 12th 0
5th 5 13th 0
6th 1 14th 2
7th 2 15th 0
8th 2 16th 1
Range: 2 years to 15.2 years
N: 29
Mean: 6.3 years
Median: 6.2 years
TABLE XX
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
TIME SPENT IN COURT AND THAT SPENT IN
MARRIAGE (INTERVALS .BY MONTHS)
Months f Months f
0-12 7 61-72 1
13-24 4 73-84 2
25-36 5 85-96 2
37-48 2 97-108 1
49-60 3 109 -12'0 2
Range: 2 months to 9. 5 years
N: 29
Mean: 3. 6 years
Median: 2. 5 years
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TABLE XXI
. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION: RATIO OF LENGTH
OF TIME IN LEGAL PROCESS TO
LENGTH OF MARRIAGE
Ratio
1. 0-1. 9
2.0-2.9
3.0-3.9
4.0-4.9
5"0-5.9
Range:
N:
Mean:
Median:
f
13
10
2
o
1
Ratio
6.0-6.9
7.0-7.9
8.0-8.9
9.0-9.9
10.0-10.9
1. 1 to 10. 1 times more
29
2.8 times
2.0 times
f
o
o
2
o
1
A possible explanation here is that if a couple has not stayed
together long enough to develop successful patterns for dealing with
disagreements that arise within the marriage, th.ey may be unable
to cope 'with the problems that remain after the marriage is termi-
nated. Dominian ,(1968) refers to couples whose marriages break
down during this early peri9d as people who lack the qualities neces-
sary to establish a minimum physical and emotional relationship.
It should be noted that in the one case in which the couple spent
10.1 times the length in the court proceedings than they did in mar-
riage, they,were married for 10 months prior to filing and spent
13.6 years from filing to the last court action.
In our study of this group of 29 case s, we developed a
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hypothesis that when the hus:band filed for divorce the time spent in
the legal process-was greater than the actual time married. Obser-
vation of our raw data seemed to indicate this to be the case. Ch,i
Sque;tre was cotnputed to,test our hypothesis. The computed Chi
'Squa,re of our sample was 2.35. Chi Square at the. 05 level with 1
degree of freedom is 3.84, which disproved our hypothesis. Chi
Square showed th~t there was no significant relationship between the
husband, as plaintiff, and the time spent in the legal process (Table
XXII).
TABLE XXII
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX OF PLAINTIFF
AND WHETHER' OR NOT THE MARRIAGE LASTED
LONGER THAN THE LEGAL PROCESS
Plaintiff
Husband Wife Total
More Marriage 20 43 63
More Fighting 14 15 ,29
, Total 34 58 92
2 2.35 2 .05, 1 df = 3.84X sample = X
We considered family size as a factor in relationship to this
special group ,with the hypothe sis that this group would have smaller
families (fewer c4i1dren) than the remainder of our sample. It had
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been observed that the mean length of marriage for this group ,was
less than the mean length for our total sample. It seemed logical to
conclude that with a shorter length of marriage, the family· size
would be smaller. We tested our hypothesis by means of Chi Square.
The computed Chi Square of our sample was 20.27. Chi Square at
the. OS,level with 4 degrees of freedomis 9.49, indicating:that our
findings ,were significant and our hypothesis was therefore accepted.
Table XXIII shows the results of the computation of Chi Square.
TABLE XXIII
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY SIZE
AND WHETHER OR NOT THE MARRIAGE LASTED
LONGER THAN THE LEGAL PROCESS
Number of Children
0-1 2 3 4 5-7 Total
More Marriage 12 22 16 9 4 63
More Fighting 19 6 3 1 0 29
Total 31 28 19 10 4 92
2
sample 20.27 2. OS, 4 df = 9.49X = X
i The above analysis was, perhaps, our most significant finding.
Smaller-sized families were very much.in evidence in this group.
The major difference between this group and the remainder of our
sample was in the one-child families. In the cases in which the
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lengths of marriage were longer than the time spent in the legal pro-
cess, there were 12 one-child families" where the expected number
was 21. 2. In thee-ase s in which the length of time spent in the legal
process was greater than the length of marriage there were 19 one-
child families, where the expected number was 9.8. Other areas of
significance were found in the group ,experiencing greater lengths in
time spent in the legal process than in marriage. These were
found in families of more than three children in which the ob-
served frequency,'was four children and the expected frequency,was
10.5.
We concluded our study of those cases in which the time spent
in legal process was longer than .the length of marriage by the de- (
velopment of two hypotheses which compared this group ito,the re-
mainder of our sample in relationship to the number of custody
changes and the number of court actions.
In considering the aspect of custody changes, our hypothesis
was that the group of 29 cases would have more custody changes
than the remainder of our sample. The computed Chi Square of ou,r
sample was 8.62. Chi Square at the. OS.level with 4 degrees 0.£
freedom is 9.49. Chi Square did not support our hypothesis and
consequently there was no significant difference between this group
'and the remainder of our sample in relationship to the number of
custody changes (Table XXIV).
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TABLE XXIV
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUSTODY CHANGES
AND WHETHER OR NOT THE MARRIAGE LASTED
LONGER THAN THE LEGAL PROCESS
Custody. Change s
0 1 2 3 4 Total
More Marriage 33 13 16 1 0 63
More Fighting 10 11 5 2 1 29
Total 43 24 21 3 1 92
2
X sample == 8.62
2
X .05, 4 df == 9.49
The final hypothesis in our inve stigation of this group was that
the group of 29 cases would have a greater number of actions than
the remainder of our sample. We tested our hypothesis by means of
Chi Square. The computed Chi Square for our sample was 2.24.
Chi Square at the. 05 level with 4 degrees of freedom is 9.49. The
test revealed that there was no significant difference between this
group 'and the remainder of our sample in relationship to the number
of court actions. Table XXV shows the re suIts of the Chi Square
computation.
It may.be speculated that many of these couples whose post-
marital conflicts continued over longer periods of time than their
marriages entered marriage with the implicit assumption that di-
vorce is a solution to marital problems.
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TABLE XXV
CHI SQUAR,E: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF
ACTIONS AND WHETHER OR NOT THE
MARRIAGE LASTED LONGER THAN
THE LEGAL PROCESS
Court Actions
3-4 5.. 6 7-8 9..;10 11-19 ' Total
More Marriage 17 21 9 8 8 63
'More Fighting 7 6 6 5 5 ,29
Total 24 27 ' 15 13 13 92
2X sample = 2. 24 2X . 05, 4 df = 9. 49
VII. SUPPORT
A large amount of data was collected on the subject of support.
We attempted to analyze the data in such a fashion that it could easily
be presented in graph form for ease of reading. We soon discovered
that there ,were so many "exceptions to the rule "and many aspects
that influenced this area of study that the only' method of presentation
that was realistic was in a narrative style. A specific bre~downof
support requests and grants at the time of the filing ,and the divorce
will be explained by tables following the presentation below.
At the time of filing there were 61 cases in which arequest
was made for a specific amount of support.
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In the Cross Complaint there were 9 cases where support was
requested by the mother" along ,with a request for custody of the
children.
In the Show Cause Motion for Pendente Lite there ,were 23 re-
quests by the wife concerning support: 7 requests for an increase
in support, 2 requests for a decrease, and 14 requests that the
father begin to pay. support.
In the Order Pendente Lite the following :were granted: 7 in-
creases, 11 decreases, and 5 orders from the court to the fathers
to begin paying support.
At the time of the Motion to Modify the Order Pendente Lite,
one father requested a decrease in the amount he was paying, two
mothers requestedadditional support, and one ,wife requested that
her husband be forced to pay.
The Order Modifying the Order Pendente Lite granted one in-
crease, one decrease, and ordered one husband to pay.
At the time of the Divorce Decree there were 72 case s in which
support was specified, 18 cases in which support was not specified,
and 2 cases in:which both parents were ordered to pay support to
maternal grandparents" who had legal custody.
At the first Motion to Modify the Divorce Decree there were
23 cases in which fathers wanted decreased support or support
eliminated because they,'were requesting a custody change, 2 cases
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in which fathers wanted support lowered because one child had
reached the age of maturity, and 1 father who claimed he was unable
to meet his support obligation. There was 1 request by a mother
that her ex~husband be forced to meet his support obligation, 6 re-
quests for a support increase and 4 requests from mothers that they
be given custody and support. There were 29 case s in -which the
father asked for custody -with no mention of support, but it is as-
sumed that supportw0uld be lowered or terminated if his request
was granted. There were 9 implied requests for support or an in-
crease in support in which the mother requested custody without any
mention of support.
In the -Order Modifying the Divorce Decree there were 15
cases in which payments were suspended, 10 reduced, 8 increased,
and 3 cases in which the father was ordered to pay. There were 9
implied reductions. where fathers received custody of all or some of
the children, although no mention was made of support. There -were
3 implied increases where mothers received custody of all or some
of the children, although, again, no mention was made of support.
The inconsistencies in data collection -and the availability of data
within the case records was again 'a problem and it was, therefore,
decided not to proceed from the first Order Modifying the Divorce
Decree in our investigation of support.
Tables XXVI and XXVII show the frequency distributions, the
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range, mean, and median of support per child per month at the time
of filing and at the time of Divorce Decree and the total support per
family per month at the time of filing and at the time o.f Divorce
Decree.
TABLE XXVI
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS: . AMOUNT OF SUPPORT
PER CI-IlLD PER MONTH AT COMPLAINT
AND DIVORCE DECREE
Supportl
Month
$ 0 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 75
76 - 100
101 - 125
126 - 150
151 - 175
176 - 200
Total
Complaint
f
1
15
.27
9
3
4
1
1
61
Divorce Decree
f
4
,25
29
9
1
3
1
o
72
Complaint
Range:
N:
Mean:
Median:
Divorce Decree
Range:
N:
. Mean:
Median:
$15 - 200 per child per month
61 (29 cases no support listed; 1 case
support and alimony one figure; 1 case
with both parents paying support)
$79.54
$75.00
$15 - 175 per child per month
72 (18 cases no support listed; 2 cases
with both parents paying support)
$63.52
.$60. 00
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TABLE XXVII
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS: TOTAL SUPPORT PER
FAMILY PER MONTH AT COMPLAINT
AND DIVORCE DECREE
Support/
Month
$ 0 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 150
151 200
201 - 250
251 - 300
301 - 350
351 - 400
401 - 450
451 - 500
Total
Complaint
f
11
11
12
8
6
8
1
1
2
1
61
Divorce Decree
f
10
26
14
11
.3
2
1
3
.2
o
72
Complaint
Range:
N:
Mean:
Median:
Divorce Decree
Range:
N:
Mean:
Median:
$40 - 500 per family per month
61 (See Table XXVI)
$174.26
$150. 00
$30 - 450 per family per month
72 (See Table XXVI)
.$136.74
$102.50
The figure reque sted for child support is usually more than the
party actually. expects the cog.rt to a~ard. Althougp..theamount of sup-
port appears to hea ne:g~~tiablef~ctor, it ic~ generally decreasedat the
time of the decree. Inmost-insta:q.ce s the custodial parent eventually
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assumes a.large sh.~re (or all) of the financial responsibility, since
the non-custodial parent either cannot or does not conti'nue to make
the pay~ent ordered by the court.
A study made by' Eckhardt (1968) of 163 fathers under court
order to pay support through divorce action during the nine-year
period from 1955-1964 revealed that 84% of these men were in devi-
ance of the court action at some time during that period, and that
only, 36% oJ tl1.is number had legal action initiated against them.
Questions that may be asked here are:
1. How realistic is it to ask a father to pay $136.74 (shown
as mean in Table XXVII) out of his net income?
2. What happens when a manre-marries and acquires a
second family to support?
The fact that many children oJ divorce do not have sufficient
economic resources to insure their minimal ,physical well-being
points to the need for a carefully studied and realistic plan for
fami!y allowanc e s.
From a view o.four data on support we developed the hypothe-
sis that the larger the amount of support asked by the wife at the
time of filing, the more court actions would ensue from the time of
filing. It seemed plausible that fathers who were asked to pay large
sumS monthly'would be involved in more court actions in, perhaps,
attempting to get support reducedand/ or custody of the children.
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The computed Chi Square of 'our sample was 16.25. Chi Square at
the. 05 .level with 20 degrees of freedom is 31. 41 ,which disproved
our hypothe sis by indicating no significant difference in the relation-
ship of the amount of support to the number of actions (Table XXVIII).
TABLE XXVIII
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOTAL SUPPORT
PER FAMILY AT TIME OF COMPLAINT AND
NUMBER OF COURT ACTIONS
Actions
Support 3-4 5 .. 6 7-8 9-10 11-19 Total
None Listed 9 8 6 3 3 29
$100 or Less 6 8 2 4 2 22
101 - 200 6 4 4 4 2 20
201 - 300 1 4 2 2 5 14
301 - 400 0 1 0 0 1 2
401 - 500 2 0 1 0 0 3
Total 24 25 15 13 13 90
Note: Two case s not used; one with mixed support and
alimony; one with both parents paying support
2
sample = 16.25
2
. OS, 20 df = 31. 41X X
As mentioned in our test of the relationsh.ip between support
and court actions, we considered whether the amount of support
would have any effect on the father s I attempts to get custody of all or
some of the children. Our hypothesis was that the larger the support
asked for by the wife at the time of filing, the more the custody
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changes throughou.-t the process. The computed Chi Square of our
sample was 7. 21. Chi Square at the . 05 level with 20 degree s of
freedom is 31.41. Again, no significance was found and our hypothe-
sis was disproved. Table XXIX shows the results of the Chi Square
c.omputa,tion.
TABLE XXIX
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOTAL SUPPORT
PER FAMILY AT TIME OF COMPLAINT AND
NUMBER OF CUSTODY CHANGES
Custody Change s
Support 0 1 2 3 4 Total
None Listed 14 7 6 1 1 29
$100 or Less 10 7 4 1 0 22
101 - 200 8 6 5 1 0 20
201 - 300 8 2 4 0 0 14
301 - 400 1 1 0 0 0 2
401 - 500 1 1 1 0 0 3
Total 42 .24 20 3 1 90
Note: Two case s not used; see Table XXVIII
2
= 7.21
2
20 df = 31. 41X sample X • OS,
The fact that our hypothesis that the larger the support asked
for by wife at time of filing, the mQre the custody changes, was dis-
proved again demonstrates that the court is not unduly influenced by
an individual's attempt 'at harassment (in this case, harassment of
ex- spouse via. support reqlle sts). Her e again the fact that the 'court
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judges each case on, its own merits is clearlydemons.trated.
In the 29 case s in which the length of the legal activity exceeded
the length of marriage, the support at the time of filing ranged from
$37.50 to $150.00 per child per month with a mean of $73. 75 per
child per month and a median of $72. 50 per child per month.
VIlle VISITA T ION
As noted in Chapter III, visitation was recorded in the Reading
.Guide as "NR" :if not recorded, "R" if the request was for reasonable
visitation, "D" if visitation :waslimited to one day at a time, "0"
if visitation was allowed for two or more successive days which
.would nece s sitate the child (or children) remaining overnight; space
was also available on the Reading Guide to indicate any special or un ...
usual arrangements that were indicated. In attempting to analyze
our clata:we decided since there were so few reports listing ."D" or
"0" for visitation, to combine these two categories and,. also, in-
clude any special and! or unusual arrangements for vistiation under
the term "specification" of visitation.
Table XXX describes visitation as it occurred through the
legal process.
In one-third of the 92 cases studied there were problems re-
garding visitation presented to the court. The table shows that in
the first two motions to modify after the decree there were 30
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TABLE XXX
DESCRIPTION OF VISITATION THROUGH THE LEGAL PROCESS
Not
Recorded Reasonable Specified
Complqint
Cross - Complaint
Show Cause Motion
Pendente Lite
Motion to Modify Pendente Lite
Order Modifying Pendente Lite
'Divorce Decree
First Order to Modify
Second Order
Third Order
Fourth Order
Fifth Order
Sixth Order
Seventh ,Order
34
12
28
8
4
4
9
40
15
12
9
4
2
1
58
20
3
17
o
o
79
19
7
2
2
o
o
o
o
o
o
8
3
3
4
18
12
4
1
1
o
1
Note: Fir st Order to Modify contained one suspension of
visitation.
Second Order to Modify contained one suspension of
visitation.
specific change s to programs of visitation. This again points out
that the period during the divorce is a time of disequilibrium for the
family; there is need for a transition period during which the family
,can stabilize and reach a point where they can cope more effectively
:with the problems that are an aftermath of their divorce. At the
time of divorce, both spouses are apt to be disorganized and unset-
tled; the father may be temporarily homeless, and planning cannot
be done for either themselves or their children in a calm and
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rational way. The court might serve these families more realis-
tically if visitation plans could be reviewed as the member s of the
family have a chance to reestablish their maximum level of function-
ing.
The above specifications all occurred in 3 5 cases. Table XXXI
shows the frequency distribution of "specifications. "
TABLE XXXI
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIFICATIONS
OF VISITATION
Number of
Specifications
I
2
3
4
5
Total
Number of
Cases
21
11
1
1
1
35
IX. PROPERTY, ALIMONY, COURT COSTS,
ATTORNEYS' FEES, RESTRAINT FROM
HARASSMENT AND MOVE
FROM THE HOME
T4is section of our study,attempts to cover the topics listed in
the heading. A very limited amount of data was available on these
subjects and, consequently, they,wi11be discussed only briefly.
Property is seldom listed factually in the legal file for
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two reasons:
1. This is public record and people for various reasons are
hesitant to list their assets and liabilities for anyone to see.
2. Frequently there is deliberate concealment so that family
possessions and assets can be used as negotiable instru-
ments by the spouses.
At the time of the divorce, property was not recorded in 20
cases,. listed as "none or limited" in 35 cases, "moderate" in 30,
and "considerable" property in 7 cases. In 64 cases there was an
indication of how the property was aplit between the plaintiff and de-
fendant. A rating scale was devised from the scale on the Reading
.Guide to measure the property at the time of the Divorce Decree. A
continuum was established in which a +7 indicated that the plaintiff
received all of the property and a -7 in which the defendant received
all of the property with compromises noted between the two ex-
tremes. Table XXXII, following the test of our next hypothesis by
means of Chi Square, shows the property split between the plaintiff
and the defendant.
A hypothesis was developed that the wife, as plaintiff or de ..
fendant, would receive a larger share of the property settlement than
her husband. Chi Square was computed dividing the property settle-
ment according to the 'sex of the plaintiff and defendant. Chi Square
of our sample was 10.63. Chi Square at the. 05.level with 5 degrees
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of freedom is 11. 07, indicating no significance in the distribution of
property according to the sex of the plaintiff and defendant.
TABLE XXXII
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVISION OF
PROPERTY AND THE SEX OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff Defendant
+ + +
5-6 3-4 1-2 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 Total
Husbands 4 3 2 5 0 2 16
Wives 6 9 3 0 3 3 24
Total 10 12 5 (24) 5 3 5 40 +(24) =64
Note: The evenly split "0" interval was not included in the
computation of Chi .Squa;re
2
X sample = 10. 63 2X . 05, 5 df = 11. 07
The table shows that division of property is not determined by
sex, but that there is a tendency for the plaintiff to receive a larger
share than the defendant. This again concurs with Metz' s (1968)
contention that the outcome of the divorce proceedings favors the
plaintiff, although it does not bear out his statement that the court is
prejudiced in favor of the wife.
Attorneys' fees and court costs at the time of the Divorce De-
cree were not asked for and not granted in 47 cases. There were no
requests for attorneys' fees, or court costs, recorded in 3 case
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records in which the court did specify an amount to be paid. Of the
42 cases requesting attorneys' fees and court costs, a mean amount
requested was $248. 76.. In the 45 cases in which a sum was awarded
the mean amount was $290.77.
At the time of the Divorce Decree, alimony,was requested by
wives in' 14 cases, but granted by the court in 24 cases. Of these 24
cases, 5 consisted of lum.p sum awards with a range of $5.00 to
$2,850, 00. Of the remaining .19 cases in which monthly alimony pay-
ments were granted, the mean monthly payment was $72.97. It,was
noted that in 50f these 19 cases, alimony payments were terminated
at the end of one year.
At the time of the Show Cause Motion for Pendente Lite, a Re-
straint from Harassment was reque sted in 12 cases and granted with
the Order Pendente Lite in,7 cases. Also, at the Order Pendente
Lite, there were 3 cases in which a Restraint from Harassment was
o.rdered against both partie s. In one case a Restraint from moving
the children .from t~e court's jurisdiction was reque stedat the time
0.£ the Show Cause Motion for Pendente Lite and this request was
granted in the Order Pendente Lite.
At the time of the Show Cause Motion for Pendente Lite, there
were four requests by one party for the court to order the other party
. from the family home. At the time of the Order Pendente Lite, in
five cases the court ordered one party to move from the family home.
129
x. THE FAMILY SERVICES DEPARTMENT
The Family Services Departm.ent of the Court of Domestic Re-
lations was involved in 47 cases of the sample on 54 occasions.
~
Figure 16 shows where in the legal process the Family Services De-
partment intervened in our sample.
Speculation here is that one-half of the sample that the Family
Services Depa,rtment saw had problems of such severe nature they
were not amenable to resolution through adversary proceedings. It
is suggested that if a subsequent study were done to determine what
happens after the Family Services Department intervenes, it would
indicate only one additional visit to the court.
It was decided to investigate those who had seen Family Ser-
vices and those who had not in relationship. to the number of court
actions. Our hypothesis was that those who saw Family.Services
would have less court actions than those who had not. The computed
Chi Square of our sample was 10.46. Chi Square at the. 05 level
with 4 degree s of freedom is 9. 49, which indicated a significant dif-
ference between the two groups. The primary area of difference was
in the nine to ten court actions interval in which the Family Services
Department was involved with 11 cases, where the expected number
was 6.6. In the group that had not seen Family Services, there were
2 cases where the expected frequency was 6.4. These findings
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Complaint
Answer and Cross Complaint
Show Cau s eMotion
Answer to Show Cause
Pendente Lite Order
Order Modifying Pendente Lite
Divorce Decree
Fir st Motion to Modify
First Order Modifying
Second Motion
Second Order
Third Motion
3
3
18
o 5 10 15
Frequency
20
/'Figure 16. Places of intervention in the legal process by
the Family,Services Department.
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indicate the reverse of our hypothesis in that those cases that were
seen by' Family Services had more court actions than those who had
not seen Family Services (Table XXXIII).
TABLE XXXIII
CHI SQUARE: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF COURT
ACTIONS AND WHETHER OR NOT FAMILY
SERVICES DEPARTMENT WAS SEEN
Actions
3 .. 4 5.-6 7-8 9-10 11-19 Total
Cases Seen 9 11 10 11 6 47
Cases Not Seen 15 16 5 2 7 45
Total 24 27 15 13 13 92
2
sample = 10.46 2.05, 4 df =9.49X X
Table XXXIII sh0ws that out of the 92 cases, 47 were seen by
the Family. Service s Department. This table highlights the fact that
in the year 1965 the court did not use the Family Services Depart-
ment to the fullest extent, in that there were 45 cases where cllstody
was at issue -and there were large numbers of actions that received
no social work services. This can undoubtedly be accounted for
through ,the court interpretations of Supreme Court rulings that
modifications of decree are based solely on the legal concept of
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"change of circumstances, " rather than on the individual needs of
1
th.e child or the child's maximum psychosocial development.
lEffective April 1969, the Honorable Jean L. Lewis has re-
appraised this position, and the Department of Family/ Service s pro-
vides services to all cases involving problems with children,
including those with modification of decrees.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY,
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In evaluating the results of this study,we found that a pattern a,f
individualization began to emerge. The judge s of the Court of
Domestic Rela:tions in Multnomah County, recognizing that the law
cannot COver every situation, seem to per sonalize decisions as much
as possible in their efforts to give paramount consideration ,to the
best interests of the child. Each family that comes before the court
is seen as unique; each case is given individual consideration based
on the carefully thought-out judgment and discretion of the court. In
many instances it is difficult to determine what is in the best inter~
e sts of the child. The situation which each parent has to offer may
,be relatively equal. A jurist is required to distinguish between
subtle variations of fact and feeling in material whIch is pre sented
in a stylized and artificial manner. Between the vagueness of the
law and the impo,rtance of their mission, judges are thought to be
omniscient, which on its face is an unrealistic societal expectation.
As ,we viewed our overall results we felt that the judges who had
been instrumental in making the decisions on the cases we had
examined deservedaJarge measure of credit for their special effo.rts
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to make wise and impartial decisions.
Just as there are no hard and set standa.rds for making deci~
sions in the intricate area of domestic relations, the interpretation
of this study should be made with a constant awareness of the unique-
ness of each o.f the 92 families under consideration. In developing
the previous chapter much care was taken to avoid a tendency to
over simplify or generalize. In spite of many similaritie swhich the
statistics reveal, each of these families is composed of individuals
who are different in themselves as well as in their relationship to
each other.
Although the original purpose of our study was to describe the
people who become involved in the court system through their need
for modification of a previous ruling, we found that we also described
the court process through which they had to pass. Our study.was
thus broadened beyond its intended scope; we found we could not
meaningfully separate people and process since they are sointri-
cately interwoven.
1. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
THIS RESEARCH PROJECT
Throughout the study two major underlying assumptions of a
somewhat contradictory nature caused the group to fluctuate between
"good" and "bad" judgments concerning our investigation.. Is it good
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or bad to move children from one home to another? Is the court
process a healing or a hurting activity? At times the g.roup,would be
pulled in one direction, at other time s in the other direction. There
'were time s when we may nat have been as objective as we would
have liked, due to the se fluctuations. Our ambivalence can: be ex-
plained by an awareness 0'£ the complexity of the many factors in-
volved, the major one s being the changing needs of the child at
different developmental stage s and the m.ultiplicity of change s affect-
ing the parents as they emerge from the divorce process. Because
human conditions are subject to constant change, it is impossible to
state whether moving children or the continuation of the legal process
is good or bad per see . Our overriding conclusion is that the court
is in fact a problem- solving resource for families who are unable to
cope with ,the problems 0.£ child custody;after divorce.
We concluded that our study ,was further limited by the follow-
ing factor s:
1. No control group ,was used.
2. We did not identify the party to' whom the decree Oaf divorce
was awarded. This was not expected to have been a signi-
ficant factor but it should have been measured.
3. As stated under the heading Implications for Further Study,
we did not conduct interviews but based our study on
material taken .from court files.
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4. The material on which our study.was based was a matter 0'£
public rec0.!,d; therefore, the information was distorted to
saIne extent, especially in the areas of property settlement
and particular s at the time of the complaint. Many.docu~
ments were out of order in the file or were missing alto-
gether.
5. The size of our sample was small and limited to one year.
6. We did not compare cases in which there were no custody
changes; i. e., where the child remained with the parent
given custody in the o.riginal divorce decree.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Our study revealed 47 cases out of our sample in which the De-
partmento£ Family Services had been involved. This social agency
adjunct to the legal system could be expected to have much meaning-
ful material relating to the group .of people studied. One of the ob-
vious areas of further study,is a detailed review of these 47 cases
and the collection of additional explanatory'and descriptive data. A
comparison could be made between these 47 cases and the remaining
.45 ,cases to see if there is any meaningful significance between these
two groups. Some 0,£ the reasons for instituting court action.would
be more explicitly stated and thereby subject to measure. The fore-
going data describes people and process but not why. Further study
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would seem to be mandatory for a clearer understanding of the fac-
tors involved in the lives of people which necessitates such a sweep-
ing change as moving.a child from one home to another.
This study constituted a review of legal files from an objective
view. While we described many things, we have included nothing of
the participants' view.. Further study could involve personal inter-
views with these people in.order to measure anda.ssess attitudes
and feelings about their experiences as they have engaged with the
court system. Also personal interviews would tend to reveal some
additional underlying dynamics involved in precipitating the types 6£
humancr"iseswhich make continuing court action necessary. In-
formation gained from personal interviews could be compared with
information contained in! Family Consultant files, which could be not
only explanatory. but perhaps also provide a basis for evaluation of
Family Consultant services.
Inmost states divorce and custody· legislation is being looked
at ina new and critical light. Changes are unquestionably indicated
but in considering the type of new legislation to institute, more
direct information is needed from the participants in the legal p,ro-
cess. This includes the people appearing .before the court for re-
dress, the judges who must make such fundamental decisions, the
attorneys who in representing their clients before the court must
take ahiased and one- sided position, and the social workers -who
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have both an evaluative and advisory role to the court. It is on this
combined experience and knowledge that new legislation should be
based.
This study is a significant beginning in contributing to the
meager research in. the area of divorce and custody. Much of the
literature in this area,is limited by lack of adequate documentation
·and thoroughresearch. In view of the growing number of individuals
involved in the divorce process it is hoped that further research will
be done to help .identify problems inherent in divorce and to help the
people involved to cope effectively with the myriad of problems sur-
rounding it.
ADDENDUM
.A recent book relevant to our study is When Parents Divorce:
A New Approach to New Relationships, by Bernard Steinzor. Since
the book was published just as our thesis was being completed, it is
not included in our chapter on Review o.f the Literature.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
READING GUIDE
I. COMPLAINT
l. Case # Date of filing
2. Plaintiff .Age H. w.
Defendant Age H. w.
3. Marriage: Date Place Length
4. Children:
5. Grounds:
6. Particular s :
7. Custody: Pltf: De£. Split
8. Visitation: NR R D 0 Special
9. Support: Alimony
10. Property: NR NL M C PIt£. all De£. all
--------
,II. ANSWER: date filed
-------------
III. CROSS COMPLAINT: date filed
----------
1. Grounds:
-----------------------
2. Particula,r s:
------------....-----------
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3. Custody: Plt£. De£. Split
------ ------- -----
4.
5.
6.
Visitation: NR R D 0 Special
--------------
Support Alimony
-------- --------------
Property: NR NL M C Plt£. all De£. all
--------
IV. SHOW ... CAUSE MOTION FOR P. L.: who filed date
---
1. Custody: Plt£. DeL Split
------ ------- -_............._-
2. Visitation: NR R DO Special
-----------~-
3. Support Alimony
_________-" -------------....0.-
4. Re str aint fromharas sment Move from house
-----
5. Attorney's fee s
----------------------
V. ANSWER TO SHOW -CAUSE MOTION: Date filed
-------
VI. ORDER PENDENTE LITE: Date filed
---...-------
1. Custody: Plt£. De£. Split
----- ------ -----
2. Visitation:· NR R D 0 $pecial
-------------
3. Support Alimony
--~----- --------------
4. Restraint from harassment Move from house
----- ---
5. Attorney's fees Referral to F. C. O.
------- ----
VII. MOTION TO MODIFY P. L. ORDER:
Date By whom filed
----------- ----------
1. Custody
---------------------..---
2. Visitation
-----------------------
3. Support
------------------------
4. Particular s
----------------------
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VIII. ORDER MODIFYING P. L. ORDER: Date
---------
1. Custody
--------------------------
2. Visitation
-----------------------
3. Support
-----------------------------
IX. DIVORCE DECREE: date Time lapse
------- -----
1. Custody: PIt£. DeL Split
------- -----......- ----
2. Visitation NR R D 0 Special
---------------
3. Support Alimony
-------- ------------
4, Attorney's fees and court costs: n. a. £.
reque sted by awarded to
--- ------ --------
5. Property: NR NL M C PIt£. all De£. all
-------
X. MOTION TO MODIFY DIVORCE DECREE: Date
------
by whom time lapse
----------- --------
1. Custody
-------------------------
2. Visitation
-----------------------
3. Support Alimony
------------ ----------
4. Changed circumstance
--------------------
XI. ORDER MODIFYING DIVORCE DECREE:
Date Time Lapse
------------- ---------
1. Custody
---------------------------
2. Visitation
-----------------------
3. Support Alimony
---------------- ---------
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XII. FAMILY CONSULTANT ACTIVITY:
1. Conciliation Service: date began (on minute order)
----
2. Family, Consultant: date (on cover of legal file)
------
XIII. OTHER
TIME INITIALS
--.------ ---
APPENDIX B
CODE SHEET
1. 3. Marriage: Give date, city and state where marriage took
place. Calculate length of marriage in years
and months from marriage date to date of filing.
4. Children: Name in first column, age in second. If sex of
child is not obvious from name, . i. e. Marion,
indicate sex.
6. PatticuJars:
A. Los s of love
B. Late hours
C. Third party (paramour)
D. Neglect of children
E. Physical abuse: describe, i. e. stabbing, shooting, etc.
F. Verbal abuse: describe, i. e. nagging, ridiculing, etc.
G. Desertion
H. J:"ealou,sy
.1. Relative interference: indicate relationship, if known
J. Non-support
K. Gambling
L. .Alcoholi sm
M. Other: specify
.7. Custody: If split, indicate how.
8. Visitation: NR:: not recorded
D =daytime
R ::: reasonable
a = overnight
Circle appropriate category; if none applies,
give details in"special" category.
9. Support:· Give figures in $/month/ child.
Alimony: Indicate whether $/month or lump sum; indicate
if request is made for legal fees.
10. Property: NR = not recorded
M= moderate
NL = none or limited
C = cons ide rable
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Circle appropriate category. Indicate how
property split whether in favor of defendant or
plaintiff.
III. 2. Particulars: Use code for I, 6.
VI. If by stipulation, note in margin· "STIP" and date.
VIII. If by stipulation, note in margin "STIP" and date.
IX. Divorce Decree: For time lapse, calculate in months the
length of time elapsed from date of filing of
complaint (I) to date of Divorce Decree (IX).
4. Attorney's fee s: n. a. f. = none asked for.
X. Motion to Modify Divorce Decree: For time lapse, calculate
in months the time elapsed
from date of divor:ce decree
to date of filing motion.
XI. Order Modifying Divorce Decree: For time lapse, calculate
in months the time elapsed
from date motion to modify
to date of order.
XIII. Other: Indicate anything unique taking place not covered
above. For example, if an answer to a motion to
modify Pendente Lite order is filed, note here.
